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Reviewed by Paul Schiff Berman* 
If the 1990s were for many a time of optimism about the efficacy of 
international law and legal institutions,1 the first decade of the twenty-first 
century has brought a backlash, at least in the United States.  The Bush 
administration’s hostility to international law is well documented,2 
Republicans in Congress are decrying the mere citation of foreign or 
international sources in U.S. Supreme Court opinions,3 and a cadre of 
international law scholars, seemingly motivated by concerns that 
international legal norms might pose undue limitations on state prerogatives 
or democratic processes, are arguing against the implementation of such 
norms domestically.4  Even those who are inclined to be more sympathetic to 
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1. See, e.g., Philippe Sands, Of Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International 
Law, 33 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 527, 536 (2001) (discussing legal decisions from the 1990s 
concerning human rights and trade and suggesting that these decisions have, “[i]n a way that was 
not necessarily predictable, . . . made a connection between international law and a broader set of 
values than those to which states have given express approval”). 
2. Indeed, the administration’s official National Defense Strategy goes so far as to lump 
together the mere use of international “judicial processes” and the use of terrorism.  According to 
the document, both are “strategies of the weak” that threaten “our strength as a nation state.”  U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 6 
(2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2005/d20050408strategy.pdf. 
3. See American Justice for American Citizens Act, H.R. 4118, 108th Cong. § 3 (2004) 
(prohibiting the federal courts from employing the “constitution, laws, administrative rules, 
executive orders, directives, policies, or judicial decisions of any international organization or 
foreign state” (other than English common law) in interpreting the U.S. Constitution). 
4. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of 
International Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 91, 103 (2000) (noting that within international institutions, “consent of the governed is 
still lacking, democratic legitimacy in the long run is still lacking”); Curtis A. Bradley, 
International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
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international human rights law have purported to show, through quantitative 
analysis, that human rights treaties may not affect actual state behavior.5 
Many of these attacks, however, misconceive the ways in which 
international law is most likely to operate.  Because international law 
generally is not backed by coercive force, it of course does not literally bind 
state actors.  Thus, if international law affects behavior at all, it does so far 
more subtly.  For example, it may slowly change attitudes in large 
populations, effecting shifts in ideas of appropriate state behavior.  In 
addition, international legal norms may well empower constituencies within 
a domestic polity and provide them with a language for influencing state 
policy, thereby affording them leverage that they would not otherwise have 
had at their disposal. 
Such subtle processes may not, at least on the surface, seem to play a 
role in constraining state behavior.  And they cannot necessarily be measured 
in immediately quantifiable ways.  But, over time, we may see changes that 
are more profound than those brought about by an ephemeral coercive statute 
enacted by a legislature.  Thus, if we want to study whether international law 
has real effects, we need to analyze these processes rather than limit our gaze 
to the question of whether international law binds states coercively. 
It is for this reason that the latest addition to the international law 
backlash genre, The Limits of International Law, by Jack Goldsmith and Eric 
Posner,6 is so disappointing.  Tendentious and unpersuasive, the book 
deploys the simplifying assumptions of rational choice theory in an attempt 
to demonstrate that international law has no independent valence whatsoever.  
Rather, according to the authors, each state single-mindedly pursues its 
rational state interest and therefore obeys international legal norms only to 
the extent that such norms serve those pre-existing interests.  Thus, they 
argue, international law is sometimes important, but only as a mechanism by 
which nation–states negotiate power, not as an independent limitation on the 
prerogatives of state governments. 
Yet, while there is certainly much work still to be done to fully study 
the variety of ways in which international legal pronouncements might or 
might not affect the behavior of state and non-state actors, The Limits of 
International Law advances the discussion hardly at all.  This is because, as 
with much rational choice analysis,7 Goldsmith and Posner must start with a 
 
1557, 1595 (2003) (arguing that international delegations raise “delegation concerns” in much the 
same manner as the “delegation concerns at issue in domestic transfers of authority”); Viet D. Dinh, 
Nationalism in the Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 867, 871–72 (2004) (characterizing international 
institutions and norms as threats to the modern nation–state). 
5. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 
1935, 2020–25 (2002) (arguing that signing human rights treaties does not correlate with increased 
human rights compliance). 
6. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
7. For a critique of rational choice analysis, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1545 (1998) (“Traditional law and economics is 
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series of assumptions that effectively clear away almost all of the ways in 
which international law and legal institutions are most likely to be effective. 
First, they assume that state interests exist independently of the social 
context within which the interests are formed.  But a policymaker’s idea of 
what is in the state’s interest is always and necessarily affected by ideas of 
appropriate action, and these ideas are likely to be shaped—even if 
unconsciously—by legal norms, including the norms of international law.8  
Moreover, such government officials, especially in a democracy, are at least 
somewhat responsive to popular opinion, and such opinion is also likely to be 
shaped by a variety of forces, again including the moral pull of international 
legal norms.  As sociolegal scholars have long described, legal norms can 
effect changes in legal consciousness that in turn alter the categories of our 
thought, such that they help determine what we are likely to see as a viable 
policy option in the first place.  Indeed, the particular brand of rational choice 
theory adopted by Goldsmith and Posner ignores even the insights of law and 
economics itself, which long ago adopted a framework that includes 
behavioral psychology within its analysis.9 
Second, Goldsmith and Posner assume that, in any given setting, a state 
actually has a single, definable set of interests.  Thus, even as rational choice 
theory has long been attacked for its reliance on the idea that individuals 
have unitary definable interests,10 Goldsmith and Posner multiply the 
problem by asserting that entire states have such interests.  Yet, given that 
states are made up of multiple bureaucrats with various spheres of authority, 
political ideologies, institutional loyalties, and interests that range from the 
goal of re-election, to the need to curry favor with particular interest groups, 
to the aim of career advancement, the idea that a state could have a single 
interest is simply unfathomable.  And that is not even counting the myriad 
forces outside of government—NGOs, editorial writers, campaign 
contributors, political movements, and so on—that all exert influence on 
government actors and all may themselves be influenced by and may 
 
largely based on the standard assumptions of neoclassical economics.  These assumptions are 
sometimes useful but often false.”).  See also DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF 
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 11 (1994) 
(“Too often prescriptive conclusions . . . are floated on empirically dubious rational choice 
hypotheses.”); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1060–70 (2000) 
(critiquing rational choice theory with evidence from the behavioral sciences). 
8. As Andrew Moravcsik puts it: “Societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state 
behavior by shaping state preferences, that is, the fundamental social purposes underlying the 
strategic calculations of governments.”  Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A 
Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 513 (1997). 
9. See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (containing 
contributions by law and economics scholars whose arguments are grounded in behavioral 
psychology principals). 
10. See generally id. (providing numerous examples demonstrating that individual interests are 
variable, rather than static, and depend on context). 
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consciously deploy the norms of international law in order to press varying 
agendas. 
Third, Goldsmith and Posner set their work in opposition to what they 
describe as “cosmopolitan theory,” which, they assert, “argues that states 
have a duty . . . to act on the basis of global rather than state welfare.”11  
Thus, they equate cosmopolitanism with a kind of utopian universalist 
utilitarianism.  But cosmopolitanism is potentially a far more nuanced theory 
than that, providing a framework for recognizing multiple community 
affiliations and multiple norm-generating entities, only some of which map 
neatly onto the fixed territorial boundaries of the nation–state system. 
As a result of their three radically simplifying assumptions, Goldsmith 
and Posner end up arguing against a straw man.  Only the most diehard 
internationalists would suggest that a state already completely united behind 
both a set of interests and a strategy for attaining those interests will practice 
self-denial solely because that strategy contravenes international law.  So, of 
course, if one starts from the premise that there are pre-existing unitary 
interests, it will be difficult to find examples where international legal norms 
appear to have any effect. 
But it is ludicrous to assume that coercively preventing states from 
doing that which they have already decided to do is the only way of 
evaluating the efficacy of international law.  Indeed, even in the domestic 
context, legal norms are effective largely because people imbibe those norms 
and adopt them as their own, not because a police officer stands behind the 
next corner waiting to pounce.  And law’s impact is not found only in literal 
obedience to rules, but in the everyday categories of our discourse.  When we 
casually refer to “private” property, “married” couples, the “rights” of 
people, and so on, we are adopting and deploying law’s power even if we are 
not aware of the fact.  Thus, over time, what a state considers to be in its 
interest is likely to change, and those changes will often be at least partly the 
product of changes in legal consciousness, which is in turn shaped by 
international law.  Moreover, various actors within the state bureaucracy (or 
those seeking to affect bureaucratic decisionmaking) will use international 
legal norms to craft political arguments within their own polities.  Again, 
such arguments will, at least sometimes, effectively shift popular or political 
consensus. 
Thus, whatever the limits of international law may be, the analytical 
framework Goldsmith and Posner construct will not help us find them.  In 
this Book Review Essay, I first outline their argument and focus particularly 
on the crucial sets of assumptions they apply to their analysis.  Then, drawing 
on sociolegal scholarship and actual examples of international law as it 
operates on the ground, I discuss two ways in which international law can 
have a significant impact, both of which are ignored by Goldsmith and 
 
11. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 14. 
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Posner.  First, I explore the concept of legal consciousness and suggest that, 
over time, international law norms may alter what both governmental actors 
and larger populations view as “right,” “natural,” “just,” or “in their interest.”  
Second, I discuss various instances in which individual constituencies both 
within and outside of government have deployed international legal norms to 
gain leverage and affect state policy choices.  Finally, I take on the distorted 
view of cosmopolitanism used by Goldsmith and Posner, and suggest that 
cosmopolitanism potentially offers a far more useful analytical lens for 
conceptualizing the ways in which multiple lawmaking communities 
construct, disseminate, and negotiate legal norms than the schematic 
simplifications of internationalized rational choice theory. 
To some degree, of course, my analysis reprises old debates between 
international relations realism on the one hand and constructivism on the 
other.  For decades realists have relied on the idea that states pursue unitary 
sets of interests (generally power and riches) and that international law is 
only instrumental.12  Likewise, constructivists have long argued that interests 
cannot exist independently of social context and that international law plays a 
role in shaping the contexts in which interests arise.13  Yet, apparently the 
 
12. See, e.g., EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS, 1919–1939, at 85–88 
(Harper & Row 1964) (1939) (rejecting internationalism/cosmopolitanism and stating that the 
principles commonly invoked in international politics were “unconscious reflexions of national 
policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time”); HANS J. 
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 5 (5th ed. 
1973) (noting that the “main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the 
landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power”); KENNETH 
N. WALZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 122 (1979) (arguing that “although states may be 
disposed to react to international constraints and incentives,” they do so only if such actions 
conform with the state’s internal interests); Robert H. Bork, The Limits of “International Law,” 
NAT’L INT., Winter 1989–1990, at 3 (arguing against the importance of international law); Francis 
A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between International Law and 
International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 193, 201 (1980) (arguing that World War II itself 
made clear that states cannot rely solely on international law to protect their interests). 
13. See, e.g., MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 3 
(1996) (asserting that states’ interests “are shaped by internationally shared norms and values that 
structure and give meaning to international political life”); THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (Thomas Risse et al., eds. 1999) (collecting 
essays on state internalization of international human rights norms); John Gerard Ruggie, What 
Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 
INT’L ORG. 855, 857-62 (1998) (tracing the roots of social constructivism to the work of Emile 
Durkheim and Max Weber); Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391, 394 (1992) (stating his intention to develop “a 
constructivist argument…on behalf of the liberal claim that international institutions can transform 
state identities and interests”).  The related discourse of transnational legal process has stressed the 
ways in which states internalize international norms into domestic law.  See, e.g., Harold Hongju 
Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 204 (1996) (“As transnational actors 
interact, they create patterns of behavior and generate norms of external conduct which they in turn 
internalize.”); see also Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 
IND. L.J. 1397, 1399 (1999) (contending that international human rights are enforced “through a 
transnational legal process of institutional interaction, interpretation of legal norms, and attempts to 
internalize those norms into domestic legal systems”); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2602 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA 
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battle must be joined once more.  The vision of international law that 
Goldsmith and Posner espouse, though newly dressed up in the trappings of 
rational choice theory and econometric analysis, is at bottom just the same 
old realist vision.  And as long as theorists continue to view international 
relations as merely a real-life version of the game of “Risk” or “Stratego,” 
devoid of sociological, psychological, or even political complexity, those 
who seek a more nuanced understanding of international law will need to 
respond. 
I. Rational Choice and International Law 
The central thesis of The Limits of International Law is easily stated.  
According to Goldsmith and Posner, international legal norms, though 
sometimes useful to states in pursuing their own interests, have no actual 
constraining effect on states.  The authors argue that states are never pulled 
into compliance with international law if such compliance would be contrary 
to the state’s interests.  Instead, they suggest that state behavior is best 
captured by four game theoretic models describing how states strategically 
pursue their interests in various forms of cooperation and competition with 
each other.  In this analysis, international law is seen only as a product of 
state interest and not as a limit on the pursuit of that interest.  Significantly, 
though this claim purports to be merely descriptive—presenting a theory of 
how states actually behave in the world—the normative thrust of the book is 
difficult to miss.  Goldsmith and Posner clearly believe that international law 
should not be treated as an independent check on state action, and their 
argument is squarely aimed at those, both within government and outside of 
it, who would view international law as a constraint.  At bottom, therefore, 
Goldsmith and Posner seek to change attitudes about international law that 
they see as an unnecessary drag on the power of states. 
Yet, like the economist in the old joke who, in order to open a can in the 
forest, must first assume a can opener, Goldsmith and Posner depend for 
their analysis almost entirely on a set of simplifying assumptions.  Indeed, 
their principal argument about international law lacking constraining effect 
makes sense only if one buys into their simplified framework.  To be sure, 
they rightly acknowledge those assumptions at the beginning of the book.  
However, mere acknowledgment of the assumptions cannot substitute for 
reasoned argument as to why those assumptions are justified.  And here the 
justifications are cursory at best.  This Part therefore discusses the 
assumptions at some length and then briefly outlines the basic trajectory of 
the argument that follows. 
 
HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
AGREEMENTS (1995) and THOMAS M. FRANK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INSTITUTIONS (1995)) (arguing that international law scholars need an “account of transnational 
legal process: the complex process of institutional interaction whereby global norms are not just 
debated and interpreted, but ultimately internalized by domestic legal systems”). 
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The crucial set of assumptions from which Goldsmith and Posner begin 
is contained in the statement that “states act rationally to further their 
interests.”14  This phrase includes at least three simplifications that are 
intrinsic to the book’s analytical framework: (1) that state interests can arise 
independently of the international law context itself; (2) that a state could 
ever have a single identifiable interest; and (3) that states act rationally to 
further those interests.  Yet, while properly acknowledging their 
assumptions, Goldsmith and Posner provide only the thinnest of justifications 
for employing them. 
As to the first assumption, Goldsmith and Posner state baldly that they 
“take state interests at any particular time to be an unexplained given.”15  
However, as will be discussed further in Part II of this Book Review Essay, 
such an assumption ignores the processes by which states (or individuals) 
develop preferences or interests in the first place.  Goldsmith and Posner 
concede that constructivists have long made this point by arguing that 
international legal norms and institutions influence not only conceptions of 
what is in the state’s interest, but also the cognitive categories through which 
the very idea of interests is viewed.16  In addition, cognitive psychology17 and 
even behavioral law and economics18 acknowledge the need to study how 
interests arise. 
In response, Goldsmith and Posner suggest first that such constructivist 
claims cannot be proved one way or the other.19  It is unclear, however, what 
the authors would accept as proof in this regard.  As we will see, there is a 
large body of sociolegal data demonstrating (or at least strongly suggesting) 
 
14. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 4. 
15. Id. at 9. 
16. See id. at 8–9 (acknowledging that constructivists seek to show that state interests can be 
influenced by international law and institutions). 
17. For discussions using cognitive psychology to show how cognitive categories and narratives 
affect thought, see generally ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 9 
(2000) (analyzing theories of categorization and noting that “categories are made in the mind and 
not found in the world”) (emphasis in original); STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: 
LAW, LIFE AND MIND 105–06 (2001) (arguing that narrative “shape[s] our expectations and 
perceptions with respect to what we deem credible” and “standard legal scholarship is just a 
particularly powerful kind of rational argument”).  Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge the 
challenge of cognitive psychology but only with regard to cognitive errors, GOLDSMITH & POSNER, 
supra note 6, at 8, not the idea that cognition is itself determined by the categories we use.  
Moreover, they dismiss cognitive psychology because it “has not yet produced a comprehensive 
theory of human (or state) behavior that can guide research in international law and relations.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  In this statement, Goldsmith and Posner seem to elevate the imperatives of their 
normative analysis above the empirical question of whether their theory actually describes human 
behavior. 
18. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 9, at 10 (contending that a better 
understanding of how interests arise may lead to “better uses of law as an instrument of social 
ordering”). 
19. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 9 (acknowledging that, while they doubt the 
constructivist argument that international law and institutions can affect state interests, they “cannot 
prove the point”). 
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that legal norms become internalized as part of the categories of human 
thought.  For example, when people think in terms of “human rights,” they 
are internalizing a set of philosophical and legal constructs, many of which 
are imbibed unconsciously.  If true, this would certainly be an example of 
international law having an effect, regardless of whether such a process of 
norm-internalization can ever be proven.  Thus, the use of the word “proof” 
here is a dodge.  Of course such complex psychological and cognitive 
causation will be difficult, if not impossible, to prove definitively.  But that 
does not mean that any view one may have about how interests arise is 
therefore equally correct.  Accordingly, it is insufficient for Goldsmith and 
Posner to state that, since neither side can “prove” whether or not 
international legal norms affect conceptions of state interest, they can just 
move on as if no challenge to their framework had been made.  Moreover, it 
should go without saying that there is nothing particularly “rigorous” or 
“empirical” about using game theory to speculate about how states act in 
certain situations, and so the implication that Goldsmith and Posner are 
somehow providing a more factually grounded account is unsupportable. 
Even more surprisingly, Goldsmith and Posner write that, even if one 
could demonstrate that state interests are themselves constructed by reference 
to international law (an idea they call the “endogenization of the state’s 
interest”20), such an understanding of how interests arise would not 
necessarily “lead to a more powerful understanding of how states behave 
with respect to international law.”21  Accordingly, they write, “[w]e provide 
our theory in the pages that follow, and we leave it to critics to decide 
whether constructivism provides a better theory of international law.”22  
Needless to say, this is not an argument at all.  Rather, Goldsmith and Posner 
appear ready to ignore constructivism even if it could be proved to their 
satisfaction that the constructivist insights were correct. 
Turning to their second assumption, Goldsmith and Posner start from 
the premise that the state can have a unitary set of interests independent of 
the multiple political players involved and their various personal and 
professional ambitions, desires, or aims.  They acknowledge, however, that 
“[s]tate interests are not always easy to determine, because the state 
subsumes many institutions and individuals that obviously do not share 
identical preferences about outcomes.”23  One would think that this fact alone 
would pose a major hurdle for the rational choice analysis Goldsmith and 
Posner wish to undertake.  Indeed, public choice theory has long sought to 
show that any idea that a political body has a single “interest” or “intent” is 
 
20. Id. at 9. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 6. 
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misguided.24  Yet Goldsmith and Posner respond with what is essentially a 
one-sentence throw away.  Despite the difficulties inherent in determining a 
single state interest, they write: “Nonetheless, a state—especially one with 
well-ordered political institutions—can make coherent decisions based upon 
identifiable preferences, or interests, and it is natural and common to explain 
state action on the international plane in terms of the primary goal or goals 
the state seeks to achieve.”25 
Again, this response provides no justification for their assumption 
whatsoever.  After all, whether it is “common” to speak of a state having 
unitary interests is completely irrelevant; the question is whether it is 
accurate to do so.  And as to whether speaking of state interests is “natural,” 
the statement is so vague that it has almost no content at all.  Perhaps most 
importantly, what can it mean to say that a state makes “coherent decisions 
based upon identifiable preferences”?  To take a particularly salient 
contemporary example, what was the “coherently” defined state interest in 
invading Iraq?  To this day no such interest has been defined or produced, 
and the diverse actors involved undoubtedly had very different interests and 
objectives.  Thus, some may have wanted to control access to Middle Eastern 
oil, others might have sought to establish a model democracy in the region, 
still others might have wanted to remove a threat to Israel, and conceivably 
some people might actually have believed the stated reason, that Saddam 
Hussein posed a military threat.  At the same time, domestic political 
strategists within the administration might simply have been counting on 
(short-term) political gains from being at war.  Accordingly, no account of 
the Iraq invasion would be even close to believable if it did not include the 
incoherent jumble of the players, as well as the various forces arrayed in 
opposition to the invasion: old-style realists, soft-power legalists and 
internationalists, peace activists, much of the military officer corps and 
intelligence community, and so on.  In any event, the one sentence 
explanation Goldsmith and Posner provide to defend their focus on unitary 
state interests is woefully inadequate to justify such an important central 
premise of the book. 
Finally, Goldsmith and Posner assume that, once a unitary interest is 
formulated, states then act rationally to pursue those interests, an implausible 
assumption (as the Iraq example makes clear) that fails to account for the 
complicated and highly irrational ways in which policy choices tend to be 
formulated and pursued.  The authors do acknowledge that, in rational choice 
theory, “rationality is primarily an attribute of individuals, and even then 
 
24. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY: SERVANT OR MASTER? 22 (1973) 
(viewing bureaucrats as self-interested utility maximizers, motivated by such factors as “salary, 
perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, . . . and ease of managing the 
bureau”). 
25. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 6. 
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only as an approximation,”26 and they recognize doubts about whether 
“collectivities can have coherent preferences.”27  But again, they brush the 
objection aside in one sentence: “[W]hen states exist, people have adopted 
institutions that ensure that governments choose generally consistent policies 
over time—policies that at a broad level can be said to reflect the state’s 
interest as we understand the term.”28  Notice the fudge words here: 
“generally consistent,” “over time,” “at a broad level,” “can be said to reflect 
the state’s interest.”  This obfuscation conceals a circularity of logic.  
Goldsmith and Posner are attempting to show that states pursue policies to 
further their interests, but here they are defining interests in terms of the 
policies pursued.  Under this approach, we need only study what 
governments do and work backwards, assuming that such acts must have 
been in furtherance of interests we can discover after the fact. 
In the end, Goldsmith and Posner appear to use purely instrumental 
justifications for sloughing off nearly all criticisms about their assumptions.  
They write that just as “[e]conomic theory has produced valuable insights 
based on its simplifying assumptions,” so too their theory “should be judged 
not on the ontological accuracy of its methodological assumptions, but on the 
extent to which it sheds light on problems of international law.”29  The 
problem with this response, of course, is that if the theory’s ontological 
assumptions are false—for example, if conceptions of interests do indeed 
reflect in part prevailing legal norms and cognitive categories, and if states 
are collections of competing players, some of whom can be empowered by 
international law to pursue certain interests over others—then the theory, as 
elegant as it might be, is not explaining how the real world operates.  Just as 
assuming a can opener won’t help open a real can in a real forest, neither can  
a set of incorrect assumptions about both human and state behavior be used 
to satisfactorily explain such state behavior in real life. 
I have spent a seemingly disproportionate amount of time on the 
assumptions underlying The Limits of International Law because in the end 
nearly all of the analytical action is concealed within those assumptions.  
Once one adopts the book’s premises, then the rest of the authors’ 
argument—that state behavior is unconstrained by international law and is 
therefore best analyzed as a series of strategic games—becomes both obvious 
and obviously correct.  If State A has a unitary interest in, say, maintaining its 
sovereign border, and if that interest precedes and is completely uninfluenced 
by international law norms about boundary disputes and any relevant limits 
on the prerogatives of sovereign states, then the question of whether State A 
attacks neighboring State B may indeed be determined based on game theory.  
The assumptions, therefore, are a crucial predicate to all that follows.  Then, 
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in the remainder of the book Goldsmith and Posner identify four possible 
game theoretic scenarios for interstate interaction—(1) coincidence of 
interest, (2) coordination, (3) cooperation, and (4) coercion—which they then 
use to explain nearly all interstate relations.  Below I briefly summarize these 
scenarios. 
According to Goldsmith and Posner, coincidence of interest occurs if, 
for example, neither of two states has any interest in encroaching on the 
other’s territory.30  Significantly, in the authors’ vision, the state’s interest 
cannot be influenced by a sense of obedience to international law norms or 
even by a sense of right behavior toward the other state.  It must instead be 
the result of each state deciding independently that it is not in its interest to 
encroach, “without any regard to the action of the other state.”31  As a result, 
the border is left in place because neither state wants what the other has. 
In contrast, a coordination game takes place if two states settle on a 
border and then respect the integrity of that border not because they are 
uninterested in seizing territory within the borders of the other, but because 
they believe that it is in their long-term interests to exist in a world in which 
borders are respected.32  Goldsmith and Posner liken this to the rule that 
everyone drive on the right (or left) side of the street.33  Without such an 
agreed-upon norm of behavior, chaos would ensue.  Thus, coordination is 
distinguished from coincidence of interest because states restrain themselves 
in order to gain long-term benefits. 
Closely related to (and in many cases indistinguishable from) 
coordination is cooperation.  The authors identify cooperation as a kind of 
mutually assured destruction.34  States refrain from encroaching based on 
mutual threats of retaliation.  The fact that Goldsmith and Posner call such a 
system of mutual threats “cooperation” tells one quite a bit about their view 
of international relations.  In any event, as with coordination, “states 
reciprocally refrain from activities . . . that would otherwise be in their 
immediate self-interest in order to reap larger medium- or long-term 
benefits.”35 
Finally, Goldsmith and Posner identify coercion.  Here, the more 
powerful of the two states simply invades and establishes a new boundary or, 
more commonly, pressures a weaker state to accede to the policy wishes of 
the more powerful state.  Thus, “[c]oercion results when a powerful state . . . 
forces weaker states to engage in acts that are contrary to their interests.”36 
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Goldsmith and Posner then attempt to explain relations between states 
using this framework.  Essentially, they argue that states may use 
international legal norms as part of one of these games, but in those instances 
international law is merely a product of state interests, not a constraint upon 
them.  According to the authors, “[i]nternational law emerges from states’ 
pursuit of self-interested policies on the international stage. . . .  It is not a 
check on state self-interest; it is a product of state self-interest.”37  This is not 
to say that they think international law is irrelevant; to the contrary, they 
suggest that states can employ various international regimes to further their 
interests.  For example, treaties “can play an important role in helping states 
achieve mutually beneficial outcomes by clarifying what counts as 
cooperation or coordination in interstate interactions.”38  But the bottom line 
for Goldsmith and Posner is that international law does not pull states into 
compliance contrary to their interests, and therefore international law will 
never have an independent valence.  International law, they write, is always 
“limited by the configurations of state interests and the distribution of state 
power.”39 
This is all well and good as far as it goes.  Indeed, nearly everyone 
would agree that states pursue some conception of interests internationally 
and that if those interests are powerful enough, they may trump contrary 
international law norms.  Similarly, there can be little doubt that 
economically and militarily powerful states have fewer constraints on their 
actions than others and so may be more able to violate international legal 
norms.  To believe in international law as an independent force in 
international relations emphatically does not require that we jettison the idea 
of power or somehow assume that states will not act in a self-interested way.  
Thus, the four forms of interstate interaction identified by Goldsmith and 
Posner surely describe many encounters among states.  Indeed, the fact that 
states rely on coincidence of interest, coordination, cooperation, and coercion 
to order international relations is sufficiently obvious that it is not entirely 
clear why they are worthy of such detailed categorization and explication. 
Accordingly, nearly all international law scholars are likely to accept 
that states are not always (or even often) altruistic, that power matters in 
international relations, and that states use various degrees of cooperation and 
coercion in their interactions with each other.  But it is a large leap from 
these rather uncontroversial propositions to the conclusion that Goldsmith 
and Posner reach: that international law has no independent constraining 
force.  It is not surprising, of course, that Goldsmith and Posner would reach 
this conclusion because, as discussed above, they start from an 
extraordinarily limited vision of how international law might operate.  They 
seem to be capable of conceiving of international law in two ways only: 
 
37. Id. at 13. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
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either as a purely external coercive force (picture an international police 
force hauling a state off to jail for violating international law norms) or as a 
non-force that is merely a mechanism for states to pursue pre-existing 
interests. 
Given those two choices, most scholars would view the second as more 
accurate.  But an analytical framework that can conceive only of those two 
choices is one that is already impoverished.  The assumptions with which 
Goldsmith and Posner begin—that states are unitary rational actors pursuing 
pre-existing interests—guarantee that they will omit from their framework all 
of the ways in which international law is most likely to have significant 
impact.  Accordingly, they do not consider the possibility that state actors, 
while pursuing their various cooperation and coercion games, are influenced 
by norms of international law that they have imbibed to such a degree that 
they have internalized them as their own.  Nor does the book contemplate the 
complex ways in which various state and non-state actors might deploy the 
rhetorically persuasive power of international law to influence the way that 
states play these games.  Thus, Goldsmith and Posner have first constructed a 
straw man version of international law—a lumbering positivist enforcer of 
international moral discipline—that almost no one believes exists and then 
dispatched this straw man to the dust bin while suggesting that they have 
therefore said something meaningful about the limits of international law. 
The remainder of the book then attempts to “demonstrate” the limits of 
international law by looking at specific examples of state behavior.  In 
particular, Goldsmith and Posner examine customary international law and 
essentially conclude that there is no such thing.  Rather, they point to 
instances when states have not followed the so-called universal norms of 
customary law and suggest that the actual patterns of state behavior reflect 
the various bilateral games discussed above rather than obedience to 
customary international legal principles.  Then they examine treaties, which 
they suggest are more effective than customary international law norms 
because treaties provide a forum to negotiate and establish what will count as 
coordination and cooperation among states.  In addition, the various 
institutions associated with the ratification and monitoring of these treaties 
provide information that can contribute to this coordination and cooperation. 
Yet, even with regard to treaties, they argue against the idea that such 
treaties have any normative force, outside of the willingness of states to back 
such treaties with coercive force.  Thus, for example, Goldsmith and Posner 
acknowledge that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) has had some success in trying war criminals, including 
Slobodan Milosevic,40 but they argue that “it was not the gravitational pull of 
the ICTY charter that lured these defendants to The Hague.  Rather, it was 
NATO’s (and primarily American) military, diplomatic, and financial 
 
40. Id. at 116. 
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might.”41  However, to the extent that part of the reason for the mobilization 
of this military, diplomatic, and financial might was the perception that 
Milosevic’s regime was violating international law, then it is difficult to see 
how this is an argument against international law’s force.  Indeed, Goldsmith 
and Posner state that the United States has consistently threatened to 
withhold foreign aid to the successor regimes in the Balkans unless they turn 
over war criminals to the ICTY.42  But while they seem to view this fact as 
evidence that international law has no effect,43 it seems to me to prove just 
the opposite.  Of course the mere creation of the ICTY by itself did not 
automatically cause war criminals to be sent there.  And I suppose in the 
positivist world Goldsmith and Posner construct that means the Genocide 
Convention and the ICTY statute had no impact.44  But it seems clear that 
international law at the very least affected the willingness of the United 
States to pursue the policies it did, which is a very significant impact.  And 
that is not even counting the impact the ICTY may have had in Bosnia itself, 
strengthening the hands of the anti-Milosevic forces and helping to turn 
popular opinion against him.  The trouble is that Goldsmith and Posner leave 
out the fact that the very existence of a treaty (or any international law norm) 
changes the bargaining power of both the states involved and the various 
actors within states who are trying to gain the upper hand in internal policy 
debates. 
To be sure, Goldsmith and Posner argue that the existence of the treaty 
is not really what causes a state to engage in coercive action.  Thus, they note 
that the U.S. intervened in the Balkans, where it had a strategic interest, but 
not in Africa, where it lacks strong strategic interests, or Saudi Arabia, 
China, or Russia, where its strategic interests conflict with insisting on 
compliance with human rights treaties.45  But this only shows that a treaty (or 
any international law norm) is generally not the sole determining factor in 
weighing state action.  And again, this is an argument against a straw man 
because no serious scholar has suggested that international law is 
automatically enforced regardless of other strategic factors.  And of course 
sometimes (and shamefully) these other strategic interests will outweigh the 
imperative to enforce international law norms.  But that is not the point.  The 
real questions are these: (1) did the existence of flagrant human rights 
violations in the Balkans provide any type of impetus for NATO intervention 
(over and above any other strategic interests); and (2) did the existence of 
these human rights norms and the ICTY itself ultimately change the internal 




43. Id. at 115–16. 
44. Id. at 111, 116. 
45. Id. at 117. 
2006] Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law  1279 
 
yes, and I think it is, then it is difficult to maintain the idea that international 
law is not having an important effect. 
Thus, the authors’ true normative intentions are unmasked.  So long as 
policymakers, bureaucrats, and the general populace of a state believe that 
international law is important, there can be little doubt that such a belief 
system will have a real impact on state decisionmaking.  As a result, the only 
way for the book’s thesis about the limits of international law to become true 
is if enough people can first be persuaded that international law is 
unimportant.  Goldsmith and Posner are certainly entitled to make this 
normative argument.  But such an argument should not be buried within a 
supposedly descriptive account of how international law actually operates. 
Finally, Goldsmith and Posner reject three supposed challenges to their 
theory.  First, they argue that just because states frequently use the rhetoric of 
international law does not mean that they are actually motivated by a desire 
to comply with it.46  Yet, though this is obviously true, it does not therefore 
mean that the rhetoric has no persuasive power over time.  Second, they 
resist any suggestion that states have a moral obligation to comply with 
international law.47  Instead, they contend that, unlike domestic law, 
international law cannot rely on theories of consent or democratic 
participation to justify obedience.48  Moreover, international law has no 
independent enforcement agent.  Yet, again they ignore the possibility that 
norms gain moral power through means other than positivist enforcers or 
democratic participation.  And they fail to see that international law norms 
are part of a “world constitutive process” of norm contestation and 
development.49  Thus, if a norm attracts enough adherents over time, it 
acquires a moral force because, as a sociological and psychological matter, 
people, including policymakers, view it as such.  As a result, to say that there 
is no moral obligation to comply with international law is, as noted above, 
simply a normative argument that states should not pay attention to such 
norms.  Third, Goldsmith and Posner argue against what they call 
“cosmopolitan theory” which supposedly suggests that states have a duty to 
act on the basis of global rather than state welfare.50  Yet, as discussed in Part 
III, their account radically limits the scope of cosmopolitanism, which 
potentially offers a more nuanced understanding of international legal 
 
46. Id. at 165. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 191–93 (noting, for example, that when states enter treaties, the treaties bind a large 
number of people to policies to which they did not consent and about which they have not had an 
opportunity to exercise rights of democratic participation). 
49. Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 253, 254–55 (1967) (referring to a process by which interactions among communities 
create “reciprocal demands, expectations, identities, and operational patterns” which then lead to 
“specialized institutional practices” that have real force in “sustaining stable contact, or restoring 
severed relations”). 
50. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 165–66. 
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process—a far more nuanced understanding, in fact, than the one Goldsmith 
and Posner themselves put forth. 
II. The Power of International Law 
As discussed in Part I, Goldsmith and Posner deny that international law 
has any independent power that would tend to pull a state toward compliance 
in opposition to that state’s interests.  But once we unpack the idea of a state 
interest, we recognize that conceptions of proper policy do not simply arise 
in a vacuum.  Rather, they are developed by human beings operating with 
various sets of assumptions, ideas about justice, conceptions of global 
strategy, and beliefs about morality.  These assumptions, ideas, and cognitive 
categories are themselves shaped in part by what sociolegal scholars have 
long termed legal consciousness.51  Thus, the legal norms that are “in the air” 
at any given moment of history—including international law norms—may 
well affect how both policy makers and ordinary citizens think about the 
state’s interests.  In addition, given that any state policy decision is inevitably 
the result of a contest among various bureaucratic power centers, all of which 
are themselves influenced by outside pressure groups, lobbyists, NGOs, and 
the like, a more complex understanding of international law would need to 
explore ways in which international legal norms empower specific interests 
both within and without the state policy-making apparatus and provide 
arguments and leverage that they might not otherwise have had.  
Accordingly, this Part first applies scholarship on legal consciousness to 
international law.  Then, it examines the ways in which international legal 
arguments are deployed by those seeking to influence state policy choices.  
In both sections, I provide examples of how international law’s power 
manifests in actual settings. 
A. International Legal Consciousness 
Goldsmith and Posner fall into the positivist trap of seeing law only as 
that which coercively forces individuals (or states) to do things that they do 
not want to do.  Not surprisingly, their view de-emphasizes the efficacy of 
international legal norms, except for treaties entered into by nation–states, 
because such norms generally do not have coercive power to back them up.  
But coercive power is not the only way that law can have an effect, either 
domestically or internationally.  Indeed, as Martha Finnemore has noted, 
“[s]ocially constructed rules, principles, norms of behavior, and shared 
beliefs may provide states, individuals, and other actors with understandings 
of what is important or valuable and what are effective and/or legitimate 
means of obtaining those valued goods.”52  As a result, law has an impact not 
 
51. See infra subpart II(A). 
52. FINNEMORE, supra note 13, at 15. 
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merely (or perhaps even primarily) because it keeps us from doing what we 
want.  Rather, law changes what we want in the first place. 
Yet, while constructivists have long made such arguments, they have 
not drawn on the extensive domestic sociolegal scholarship on legal 
consciousness.  That is a shame because legal consciousness scholars have 
sought to study empirically just how it is that legal categories become 
reflected in ordinary discourse and thought.  Indeed, such scholars have 
argued that law operates as much by influencing modes of thought as by 
determining conduct in any specific case.53  It is a constitutive part of culture, 
shaping and determining social relations54 and providing “a distinctive 
manner of imagining the real.”55 
For example, “[l]ong before we ever think about going to a courtroom, 
we encounter landlords and tenants, husbands and wives, barkeeps and hotel 
guests—roles that already embed a variety of juridical notions.”56  Indeed, 
we cannot escape the categories and discourses that law supplies.57  These 
categories may include ideas of what is public and what is private, who is an 
employer and who is an employee, what precautions are “reasonable,” who 
has “rights,” and so on.58  In short, “it is just about impossible to describe any 
 
53. See, e.g., KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY 30–32 (1988) (examining “the 
role of legal ideology in structuring mass consciousness”); PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, 
THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 45 (1998) (defining “legal 
consciousness” and arguing that “every time a person interprets some event in terms of legal 
concepts or terminology—whether to applaud or to criticize, whether to appropriate or to resist—
legality is produced” and “repeated invocation of the law sustains its capacity to comprise social 
relations”); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF 
LEGAL MOBILIZATION 7 (1994) (“Legal (or rights) consciousness . . . refers to the ongoing, 
dynamic process of constructing one’s understanding of, and relationship to, the social world 
through use of legal conventions and discourses.”); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND 
GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 5 (1990) (arguing 
that “[l]egal consciousness is expressed by the act of going to court as well as by talk about rights 
and entitlements” and that such “[c]onsciousness develops through individual experiences”); Susan 
S. Silbey, Making a Place for Cultural Analyses of Law, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39, 42 (1992) 
(noting that “law contributes to the articulation of meanings and values of daily life”). 
54. See, e.g., id. at 41 (arguing that “law is a part of the cultural processes that actively 
contribute in the composition of social relations”). 
55. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE 
ANTHROPOLOGY 173 (1983). 
56. Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism? Cultural Analysis, Cultural 
Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3, 20 (2001). 
57. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 105 (1984) (“[I]n actual 
historical societies, the law governing social relations—even when never invoked, alluded to, or 
even consciously much thought about—has been such a key element in the constitution of 
productive relations that it is difficult to see the value . . . of trying to describe those relations apart 
from law.”). 
58. Indeed, according to Sarat and Kearns: 
Perhaps the most stunning example of law’s constitutive powers is the willingness of 
persons to conceive of themselves as legal subjects, as the kind of beings the law 
implies they are—and needs them to be.  Legal subjects think of themselves as 
competent, self-directing persons who, for example, enter bargained-for exchanges as 
free and equal agents. 
1282 Texas Law Review [Vol. 84:1265 
 
set of ‘basic’ social practices without describing the legal relations among the 
people involved—legal relations that don’t simply condition how the people 
relate to each other but to an important extent define the constitutive terms of 
the relationship . . . .”59 
Because legal categories and ideas suffuse social life,60 scholars have 
studied both how people think about the law and the ways in which largely 
inchoate ideas about the law can affect decisions they make.61  Sally Engle 
Merry observes legal consciousness in “the way people conceive of the 
‘natural’ and normal way of doing things, their habitual patterns of talk and 
action, and their commonsense understanding of the world.”62  These 
understandings are often taken for granted.  This is because legal 
consciousness may be so much a part of an individual’s worldview that it is 
present even when law is seemingly absent from an understanding or 
construction of life events.63  Thus, “[w]e are not merely the inert recipients 
of law’s external pressures.  Rather, we have imbibed law’s images and 
meanings so that they seem our own.”64  Law is an often unnoticed, but 
 
Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal Scholarship and 
Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21, 28 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993). 
59. Gordon, supra note 57, at 103. 
60. See Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New 
Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 903, 907 (1996) 
(“Law and Society scholarship depicts the law as a culturally and structurally embedded social 
institution.”). 
61. Indeed, various authors have explored the legal consciousness of average citizens.  See, e.g., 
BUMILLER, supra note 53; EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 53; MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS 
IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979); MCCANN, supra 
note 53; MERRY, supra note 53; BARBARA YNGVESSON, VIRTUOUS CITIZENS, DISRUPTIVE 
SUBJECTS: ORDER AND COMPLAINT IN A NEW ENGLAND COURT (1993); Patricia Ewick & Susan S. 
Silbey, Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An Account of Legal Consciousness, 26 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 731 (1992); Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and 
Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens about Law and Street Harassment, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1055 
(2000); Austin Sarat, “. . .The Law Is All Over”: Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness 
of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990); Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, 
Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer’s Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663 
(1989). 
62. MERRY, supra note 53, at 5; see also Gordon, supra note 57, at 101 (arguing that we should 
“treat legal forms as ideologies and rituals whose ‘effects’—effects that include people’s ways of 
sorting out social experience, giving it meaning, grading it as natural, just, and necessary or as 
contrived, unjust and subject to alteration—are in the realm of consciousness”); Sarat & Simon, 
supra note 56, at 19 (“Law is part of the everyday world, contributing powerfully to the apparently 
‘stable, taken-for-granted quality of that world and to the generally shared sense that as things are, 
so must they be.’”)(quoting Sarat & Kearns, supra note 58, at 30)). 
63. See David M. Trubeck, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 
STAN. L. REV. 575, 604 (1984) (“Law, like other aspects of belief systems, helps to define the role 
of an individual in society and the relations with others that make sense.”); see also JEAN 
COMAROFF, BODY OF POWER, SPIRIT OF RESISTANCE: THE CULTURE AND HISTORY OF A SOUTH 
AFRICAN PEOPLE 4–5 (1985) (arguing that consciousness is “embedded in the practical constitution 
of everyday life, part and parcel of the process whereby the subject is constructed by external 
sociocultural forms”). 
64. Sarat & Kearns, supra note 58, at 29.  See also Gordon, supra note 57, at 109 (“[T]he power 
exerted by a legal regime consists less in the force that it can bring to bear against violators of its 
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nevertheless crucial, presence in our ideas of what is fair, appropriate, or 
natural.65 
This focus on law in everyday life66 recognizes that people interpret 
their experiences by drawing on a collaboration of law and other social 
structures.67  These interpretations may be widely varied and will, of course, 
depend partly on social class, prior contacts with the law, and political 
standing.68  Nevertheless, legal consciousness constitutes an ongoing 
interaction between official norms as embodied in the common sense 
categories of daily life and each individual’s ongoing participation in the 
process of constructing legality.69  Accordingly, legal consciousness includes 
the ways in which individuals themselves deploy, transform, or subvert 
official legal understandings and thereby “construct” law on the ground.70  
 
rules than in its capacity to persuade people that the world described in its images and categories is 
the only attainable world in which a sane person would want to live.”). 
65. See Gordon, supra note 57, at 111 (“In short, the legal forms we use set limits on what we 
can imagine as practical options: Our desires and plans tend to be shaped out of the limited stock of 
forms available to us: The forms thus condition not just our power to get what we want but what we 
want (or think we can get) itself.”).  Indeed, scholars have noted that people’s judgments about 
praise and blame will often match the corresponding legal categories, even when those people are 
not familiar in detail with legal rules and doctrines.  See generally THE ALLOCATION OF 
RESPONSIBILITY 109, 155–58 (Max Gluckman ed., 1972) (collecting essays by multiple authors 
analyzing similarities between industrialized societies and primitive African tribes in terms of their 
legal systems and behavioral patterns). 
66. See, e.g., LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993). 
67. David M. Engel & Frank W. Munger, Rights, Remembrance, and the Reconciliation of 
Difference, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7, 14 (1996) (asserting that their “study points to the mutuality 
and inseparability of law, culture, identity and experience” and that “[l]aw is one of the elements 
that constitute the categories and routines of everyday life”); Sarat, supra note 61, at 346 (arguing 
that welfare recipients, for example, “use legal ideas to interpret and make sense of their 
relationship to the welfare bureaucracy even as they refine those ideas by making claims the 
meaning and moral content of which are often at variance with dominant understandings”). 
68.  See, e.g., Davina Cooper, Local Government Legal Consciousness in the Shadow of 
Juridification, 22 J. L. & SOC’Y 506, 510 (1995) (“[L]aw is understood experientially, in ways 
shaped by class, education, geography, and occupational positioning.”); Carroll Seron & Frank 
Munger, Law and Inequality: Race, Gender . . . and, of Course, Class, 22 ANN. REV. SOC. 187, 202 
(1996) (asserting that “[t]he relationship between lawyers and the evolution of  . . . the class 
system[] should be a prime area for continuing development of theory and research”). 
69. “Legality” is defined as those meanings, sources of authority, and cultural practices that are 
in some sense legal although not necessarily approved or acknowledged by official law.  The 
concept of legality offers the opportunity to consider “how, where and with what effect law is 
produced in and through commonplace social interactions . . . .  How do our social roles and 
statuses, our relationships, our obligations, prerogatives, and responsibilities, our identities, and our 
behaviors bear the imprint of law?”  EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 53, at 20.  See also Sarat & 
Kearns, supra note 58, at 55. (“Law is continuously shaped and reshaped by the ways it is used, 
even as law’s constitutive power constrains patterns of usage.”). 
70.  See, e.g., Austin D. Sarat, Redirecting Legal Scholarship in Law Schools, 12 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 129, 140 (2000) (reviewing PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW (1999)) 
(“Contests over meaning in courts or communities . . . become occasions for [sociolegal scholars to 
observe] the play of power.  Meanings that seem natural, or taken-for-granted, are described as 
hegemonic, but because the construction of meaning through law is, in fact, typically contested, 
scholars show the many ways in which resistance occurs.”) (citation omitted).  For discussions of 
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We all take part in the construction of legal consciousness, even as we are 
also inevitably affected by the legal categories of the social structures around 
us. 
Although a detailed discussion of the legal consciousness literature is 
beyond the scope of this Book Review Essay, it seems clear that when 
Goldsmith and Posner complain that the international law constructivist 
literature lacks “a mechanism for how moral and legal talk influences 
national behavior,”71 legal consciousness scholarship provides part of an 
answer.  And while it is difficult to definitively prove a direct causal link 
between a legal conception and an individual’s category of thought, that does 
not mean that such processes are not very powerful determinants of how we 
think. 
Ironically, in another context Jack Goldsmith himself appears to have 
acknowledged the importance of changes in legal consciousness.  In an 
article cowritten with Cass Sunstein, Goldsmith notes that the recent creation 
of military commissions to try alleged terrorists engendered a storm of 
protest even though President Roosevelt’s similar decision to create a 
military commission during World War II was widely praised.72  The authors 
take up the task of trying to explain this difference in response.  In the end, 
they suggest that one of the most important changes from World War II to 
today is “a massively strengthened commitment to individual rights, not only 
within the culture but within the legal system itself.”73  For example, they 
note that in 1942 the country was much less libertarian in its outlook: 
[R]estrictions on free speech did not produce a firestorm of public 
protest.  Libelous speech was commonly regulated, without 
discernible public objection. . . .  [P]ublic opposition to discrimination 
was far more tepid than it is today.  Nor did the public insist on what 
we now take to be minimal procedural safeguards for the accused.74 
Goldsmith and Sunstein do not delve into the question of what caused these 
shifts in social attitudes,75 but it seems quite clear that changes in the 
framework of constitutional law had something to do with it.  And we need 
not engage in unsolvable conundrums such as whether changes in attitudes 
lead to changes in law or vice versa to recognize that, at the very least, the 
changes in law reinforce shifts in societal perceptions, even among those 
who are not consciously aware of the actual legal doctrines they have 
imbibed.  Thus, as discussed in more detail below, ordinary people are far 
 
these forms of resistance, see EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 53; Ewick & Silbey, supra note 61; 
MERRY, supra note 53; Yngvesson, supra note 61. 
71. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 171. 
72. Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a 
Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 261–62 (2002). 
73. Id. at 282. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
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more likely to frame their claims in rights terms after the so-called rights 
revolution of the Warren and Burger Court eras, than they would have in 
earlier periods of American history. 
Although Goldsmith and Sunstein acknowledge changes in domestic 
law during the sixty years from Roosevelt’s military commissions to today, 
they do not focus on the parallel “rights revolution” in international law.  
Since World War II, we have seen the large-scale development of 
international human rights treaties, conventions, declarations, courts, and 
institutions, along with their related monitoring bodies, NGO watchdog 
groups, and cause lawyers.  While it is unclear, as Goldsmith and Sunstein 
point out, whether the military commissions are actually illegal under 
international law,76 the crucial point is that all of this international norm 
development (along with the concurrent—and obviously related—rise in 
rights talk under the U.S. Constitution) is likely to have affected perceptions 
and intuitions about the propriety and wisdom of creating military 
commissions today.  Likewise, it is striking that even the Bush administration 
was forced to pay lip service to the United Nations during the run-up to the 
invasion of Iraq, if only because U.S. popular opinion demanded it.77  Indeed, 
various polls taken in February and March 2003 indicated that a sizable 
majority of Americans wanted the U.S. to work through the U.N.78  This too 
is undoubtedly, in part, the result of changes in legal consciousness over the 
past sixty years about international legal institutions and international 
processes. 
Other domestic examples help suggest ways in which legal norms 
change consciousness over time, even when the literal enforcement of the 
legal norm is lacking.  Perhaps the most famous such instance is the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s declaration in Brown v. Board of Education79 that racially 
segregated schools were inherently unequal.  This declaration had enormous 
 
76. See id. at 277–78 (describing the “possible illegality” of the Bush order). 
77. See Ron Hutcheson, Bush Acts to Rally the Nation for Iraq War, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, 
Mar. 3, 2003, at A5 (noting that while Bush repeatedly said that he was prepared to go to war with 
or without U.N. backing, public approval for such a war turned to opposition “if the United States 
ha[d] to act without U.N. support” and that “[d]espite Bush’s public disdain for polls, he and his 
advisers are keeping close watch on the national mood in the final countdown to war”). 
78. For example, one survey from February 2003 indicated that nearly 65% of Americans 
believed that it was at least “desirable” for the U.S. to get a fresh mandate from the United Nations 
before launching military action in Iraq. See Editorial, Behind Bush & Blair, INVESTOR’S BUS. 
DAILY, Feb. 24, 2003, at A18 (commenting on a recent IBD/TIPP Poll and observing that “34% [of 
Americans] insist on a U.N. mandate before we can go [into Iraq] and another 29% say that would 
be desirable, though not essential”).  Likewise, 62% of those surveyed in a Los Angeles Times poll 
“said they would back a war effort endorsed by the U.N. Security Council” with only 55% 
supporting a “military action with some allied backing, but without U.N. concurrence.”  Mark Z. 
Barabak, Showdown with Iraq; The Times Poll, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, at A1.  Even as late as 
March 13–16, 54% of Americans believed that the United States should first get a U.N. resolution 
to use force before attacking Iraq.  THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, AMERICA’S IMAGE FURTHER 
ERODES, EUROPEANS WANT WEAKER TIES 7 (2003), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/175.pdf. 
79. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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importance as a statement of an assimilationist ideal, even though legally 
enforced segregation persisted for many years,80 and de facto segregation still 
exists today.81  Of course, some may justly believe that the mere statement of 
a norm is woefully insufficient when true enforcement is necessary, but that 
does not mean that the normative statements are not independently 
important.82  Indeed, as Jeremy Waldron points out, Brown’s “archetypal 
power is staggering: In the years since 1954 it has become an icon of the 
law’s commitment to demolish the structures of de jure (and perhaps also de 
facto) segregation and to pursue and discredit forms of discrimination and 
badges of racial inferiority wherever they crop up in American law or public 
administration.”83  As one African-American man, serving in the Marines at 
the time, has stated: 
On this momentous night of May 17, 1954, I felt that at last the 
government was willing to assert itself on behalf of first-class 
citizenship, even for Negroes.  I experienced a sense of loyalty that 
I had never felt before.  I was sure that this was the beginning of a 
new era of American democracy.84 
Even though the federal government’s commitment to ending segregation 
lagged over the next ten years,85 the sentiments expressed by this man 
indicate the psychological effects of even a legal statement that is not 
enforced. 
Moreover, while it is, of course, “impossible to gauge the specific 
consequences of any given court decision, given that such decisions occur 
 
80. See PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 109–10 (1988) (“The Supreme 
Court’s refusal to set deadlines for desegregation invited Southern officials to invent foot-dragging 
tactics, and frustrated the NAACP lawyers who had struggled for years with cautious and often 
hostile federal judges, most of them closely tied to [the] local power structures.”). 
81. See generally, e.g., Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between 
Residential Segregation and School Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 795 (1996) (arguing that school 
segregation remains high in large part because of high degrees of residential segregation). 
82. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 111 (1977) (distinguishing between 
the “enactment force” and the “gravitational force” of precedents). 
83. See Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1725 (2005); see also Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE 
AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 3, 3–4 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (noting 
Brown’s enduring iconic power in contemporary American culture and politics); Christopher E. 
Smith, Law and Symbolism, 1997 DET. C. L. REV. 935, 938  (“Although actual implementation of 
school desegregation took many years, the Supreme Court’s decision [in Brown] constituted an 
important symbolic statement that could call attention to injustice, confer legitimacy upon civil 
rights activists, and encourage political mobilization against discrimination.”). 
84. THE EYES ON THE PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTS READER 36 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 1991). 
85. See Sheryll D. Cashin, The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Coalition Politics, 49 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 1029, 1033–34 (2005) (“In the ten years between the Supreme Court’s announcement of the 
Brown decision . . . and the passage of the [Civil Rights Act of 1964], virtually no progress was 
made in school desegregation.”). 
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within a larger social context,”86 Brown generated optimism within activists 
in the civil rights movement and helped provide them with an additional 
platform.87  As one commenter has noted, “[o]ne of the major consequences 
of the Brown decision was that it was a catalyst for hope and mobilization, 
rousing the most vigorous and sustained movement for change ever mounted 
in the United States.”88  Indeed, in the ten years following Brown, civil rights 
activity was extraordinary, culminating in the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.89  And while it is possible to debate the degree to which legal 
decisions such as Brown reflect societal change or help cause such change, 
there can be little doubt that Brown was, at the very least, an inspiration to 
other mobilizing groups, such as women, homosexuals, the elderly, and the 
disabled.90 
Finally, the change in racial attitudes—at least as expressed in opinion 
polls—since Brown is extraordinary.  In 1954, when the case was decided, 
55% of Americans approved of the decision and 40% disapproved.91  Forty 
years later, 87% approved and 11% disapproved.92  Likewise, in 1942, 68% 
of the American public supported racially segregated schools; by 1985 that 
number had dropped to 7%.93  And the decades since Brown have brought an 
American consensus in favor of equal access to jobs not only for African 
Americans but for all groups.94  As one sociologist has observed, these 
changes have been “large, steady, and sweeping.”95  Of course, such changes 
have not eradicated racism (though they may have pushed it underground), 
nor are they all directly attributable to Brown, but it seems clear that, 
whatever the combination of causes, there has been a shift in legal 
consciousness since the Brown decision. 
 
86. Margaret L. Andersen, From Brown to Grutter: The Diverse Beneficiaries of Brown v. 
Board of Education, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1073, 1079. 
87. Id. at 1079 (“Perhaps the most immediate consequence of the Brown decision was the 
optimism it generated, and the platform it created, for the mobilization of the Civil Rights 
Movement.”). 
88. Id. at 1081.  But see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights 
Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 11 (1994) (finding little evidence of this effect and suggesting that 
Brown was a catalyst for the Civil Rights Act only because the decision pushed white southerners so 
far to the right that it provoked a national backlash). 
89. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
90. Andersen, supra note 86, at 1081. 
91. Julie Ray, Reflections on the “Trouble in Little Rock,” Part II, GALLUP POLL TUESDAY 
BRIEFING, Mar. 4, 2003, at 71. 
92. Id. at 72. 
93. Lawrence D. Bobo, The Color Line, the Dilemma, and the Dream: Race Relations in 
America at the Close of the Twentieth Century, in CIVIL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL WRONGS: BLACK-
WHITE RELATIONS SINCE WORLD WAR II, at 31, 36 (John Higham ed., 1997). 
94. See Daniel Yankelovich, How Changes in the Economy Are Reshaping American Values, in 
VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY 16, 31–32 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1994) (“Unlike the America of 
the 1930s, the American public today accepts a pluralistic society in which women and minorities 
have access to equal opportunities with white males.”). 
95. Bobo, supra note 93, at 38. 
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Similar changes can be seen elsewhere in domestic law.  For example, 
prior to the enactment of laws protecting battered women, acts of domestic 
violence such as marital rape had not been viewed as serious social problems, 
let alone crimes.96  Efforts to criminalize such behavior therefore 
symbolically indicated that the criminal justice system was beginning to take 
violence against women seriously.97  Most importantly, wife abuse was 
moved out of the private sphere and into public awareness.  Indeed, the mere 
idea that spousal abuse might actually be a crime rather than a private dispute 
is a significant change.  Thus, the criminal justice system now incorporates, 
at least to some extent, feminist ideas about domestic violence into its 
standard understanding of violence between males and females. 
Likewise, sexual harassment law has brought about large attitudinal 
shifts that go far beyond the literal legal requirements.  For example, 
corporations responding to the threat of Title VII have introduced major 
institutional changes that have altered many aspects of workplace culture.98  
At the same time, male–female relations in the workplace now reflect 
internalized norms against sexual harassment.99  One can dispute whether the 
impacts have been good or bad, but it is difficult to deny them altogether.  
And while feminists and religious conservatives may debate the wisdom of 
the no-fault divorce revolution,100 neither side seriously disputes that the 
 
96. See SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF 
THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 157–69 (1982) (chronicling difficulties women faced in 
convincing police to make arrests or in convincing courts to provide remedies in domestic violence 
cases).  Indeed, for many years rape laws featured an exception that made it impossible for a 
husband to rape his wife.  See, e.g., Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 223 (Ga. 1985) (discussing 
common law theory that a husband could not be held criminally liable for raping his wife). 
97. See Adele M. Morrison, Queering Domestic Violence to “Straighten Out” Criminal Law: 
What Might Happen when Queer Theory and Practice Meet Criminal Law’s Conventional 
Responses to Domestic Violence, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 81, 84 (2003) (arguing that 
“interventions such as arrest, prosecution and treatment” symbolically indicated “that the system 
was beginning to take violence against women seriously”). 
98. As Susan Sturm has noted: 
Proactive lawyers (some plaintiffs’, some management’s) are spearheading the 
redesign of employment systems in companies concerned about the adequacy and legal 
vulnerability of their workplace practices.  Civil rights-oriented lawyers are serving 
stints in newly-designed positions within companies that have embarked on major 
change initiatives.  Workplace advocacy organizations are experimenting with 
interesting combinations of law, policy, organization, community development, 
training, and institutional redesign. 
Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 277, 278. 
99. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2064 (2003) (arguing that 
“sexual harassment law, as envisioned by some feminist reformers and implemented by many 
human resource (HR) managers, has become an important justification for a neo-Taylorist project of 
suppressing sexuality and intimacy in the workplace”). 
100. Compare Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 75, 86 (2004) (arguing that “the availability of free exit through no-fault divorce” is “a 
bedrock liberal value” that “stands for the right to withdraw or refuse to engage; it is the ability to 
dissociate, to cut oneself out of a relationship with other persons”), with Katherine Shaw Spaht, 
Revolution and Counter-Revolution: The Future of Marriage in the Law, 49 LOY. L. REV. 1, 9 
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change in divorce laws has helped alter cultural attitudes about marriage and 
divorce over the past three decades. 
It is true, as mentioned previously, that these various changes cannot 
ever be traced solely to changes in legal norms.  Indeed, in all of these cases, 
the legal changes occurred alongside social and political changes, and 
disentangling which caused which would be an impossible (and fruitless) 
effort.  Moreover, there are also instances when changes in law do not appear 
to have affected either actions or attitudes on the ground.  Perhaps most 
famously, Stewart Macaulay’s study of contractual relations seems to 
indicate that changes in contract law doctrine had no impact on the form 
contracts used all the time by repeat players in the manufacturing sector, who 
relied on more informal sanctions to encourage contract compliance and who 
never envisioned going to court over a contract dispute in any event.101 
Because of these sorts of limitations, constructivism has sometimes 
been criticized for lacking analytical rigor, and it has not been very 
successful in developing a framework that would allow one to predict in 
advance when a legal regime is likely to shape attitudes, interests, and 
consciousness, and when it is not.102  Indeed, Goldsmith and Posner would 
likely argue that the inability to predict when international law will affect 
state decisions and when it will not renders it useless as a tool for discussing 
international relations. 
Yet there is no reason to sacrifice a richer understanding of empirical 
phenomena just because one wants the supposed clarity of a distortingly 
simplified framework.  The mere fact that changes in legal consciousness are 
difficult to quantify and predict does not render them any less important in 
analyzing state behavior concerning international law.  Indeed, there are 
simply too many instances when we do see state actors internalize the norms 
of international law to dismiss them as flukes or explain them away as mere 
strategic behavior.  Perhaps the best-known example of a change in 
international legal consciousness concerns the very idea of crimes against 
humanity.  At the time of the Nuremberg prosecutions, it was not at all clear 
that the pre-war atrocities committed by the German government against 
German citizens constituted an international crime punishable outside 
Germany itself.103  Yet, the statute of the Nuremberg tribunal and the 
 
(2003) (“The repeal of the law of legal separation and the substitution of the procurement of divorce 
with relative ease affected the stability of marriage, not only as to its duration, but also as to its 
quality.”). 
101. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963). 
102. See Ruggie, supra note 13, at 883 (acknowledging that constructivism “remains relatively 
poor at specifying its own scope conditions, the contexts within which its explanatory features can 
be expected to take effect”). 
103. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Punish Human Rights Violations 
of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2555 (1991) (“To the extent that they reached Nazi offenses 
against German nationals, the Nuremberg prosecutions represented a radical innovation in 
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decisions of the tribunal itself effectively established such a crime.104  Then, 
subsequent to Nuremberg, almost every state for the first time voluntarily 
subjected itself to the Genocide Convention,105 further enshrining the idea 
that individuals might have international rights against their own nation–
states.  Today, this idea is sufficiently well accepted that we commonly see 
international prosecutions for crimes against humanity committed within 
state borders,106 and the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over 
such crimes.107  Significantly, though the U.S. has not ratified the 
International Criminal Court statute,108 the basic idea of a crime against 
 
international law.  With few and limited exceptions, international law had not previously addressed 
a state’s treatment of its own citizens, much less imposed criminal sanctions for such conduct.”). 
104. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279, Art. 6(c) (establishing individual responsibility for crimes against humanity 
committed “before or during the war”) (emphasis added); International Military Tribunal, Opinion 
& Judgment, The Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/judlawre.htm.  At the time, this issue raised serious 
retroactivity concerns precisely because the statute was effectively establishing a new international 
crime.  Accordingly, the Tribunal finessed this issue, interpreting the statute to give the Tribunal 
jurisdiction over only those crimes against humanity that were deemed sufficiently related to the 
other two crimes in the statute: crimes against peace and war crimes.  See id. (“To constitute crimes 
against humanity, the acts relied on before the outbreak of war must have been in execution of, or in 
connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”). 
105. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 
1948, art. 2, S. Exec. Doc. O, 81-1, at 7 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280.  For a list of ratifying 
countries, see http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/1.htm. 
106. See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 837, 841–42 (2005) (considering the work of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and noting that war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide “have been made subject to international jurisdiction, although some were committed 
domestically, reflecting radical developments in the construction of international criminal 
jurisdiction”). 
107. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999. 
108. See http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/worldsigsandratifications.html (listing ratification 
history of the statute). 
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humanity under international law is no longer seriously in doubt,109 
signifying an important shift from World War II to the present day.110 
In addition, there is evidence that even military officers, who might be 
supposed to resist any limits on their strategic behavior, may come to imbibe 
and espouse international norms.  For example, in the U.S. military, every 
proposed bombing target is vetted by lawyers who work to ensure that the 
minimum possible collateral damage is created, in accordance with 
international law.111  Likewise, military lawyers and current and former 
military officers have been among the loudest opponents of the Bush 
administration’s lack of concern for abiding by the Geneva Conventions in 
detaining and interrogating terrorism suspects.112  These acts are not 
 
109. For example, the U.S. supported the creation of the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia), see Wayne Sandholtz, The Iraqi National Museum and International 
Law: A Duty to Protect, 44 COLUM. J. INT’L L. 185, 204 (2005) (“The United States supported the 
creation of the ICTY and has contributed to its work, not least by providing experienced 
investigators and prosecutors to the ICTY Office of The Prosecutor.”), whose enabling statute 
included crimes against humanity in its jurisdictional reach.  Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 5, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192, 1193–94.  In addition, 
U.S. courts have regularly recognized crimes against humanity as a violation of the Law of Nations 
that is cognizable under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.  See, e.g., Beth Stephens, 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door is Still Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 
BROOK. L. REV. 533, 537 & n.18 (2004) (noting U.S. cases interpreting the ATCA that have 
“recognized a small core of actionable human rights violations in addition to torture, including 
summary execution, disappearance, war crimes, crimes against humanity, slavery, and arbitrary 
detention” ) (emphasis added). 
110. See, e.g., David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 85, 86 
(2004) (“The phrase ‘crimes against humanity’ has acquired enormous resonance in the legal and 
moral imaginations of the post-World War II world.”). 
111. SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 13-1AOC, VOL. 3 § 8.4 (2005), 
available at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/13/afi13-1aocv3/afi13-1aocv3.pdf. 
112. For example, in six memoranda dated from February 5 to March 13, 2003, the Air Force, 
Army, Navy, and Marine Offices of the Judge Advocate General protested “extreme” interrogation 
techniques being permitted in the so-called war against terrorism.  Memorandum from Jack L. 
Rives, Major Gen., U.S. Air Force, Deputy Judge Advocate Gen., to Air Force Gen. Counsel (Feb. 
5, 2003), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf; Memorandum from Jack L. Rives, 
Major Gen., U.S. Air Force, Deputy Judge Advocate Gen., to Air Force Gen. Counsel (Feb. 6, 
2003), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf; Memorandum from Michael F. Lohr, 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Judge Advocate Gen., to Air Force Gen. Counsel (Feb. 6, 2003), 
available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf; Memorandum from Kevin M. Sandkuhler, 
Brigadier Gen., U.S. Marine Corps, Staff Judge Advocate to Commandant of the Marine Corps, to 
Air Force Gen. Counsel (Feb. 27, 2003), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf; 
Memorandum from Thomas J. Romig, Major Gen., U.S. Army, Judge Advocate Gen., to Air Force 
Gen. Counsel (Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf; Memorandum 
from Michael F. Lohr, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Judge Advocate Gen., to Air Force Gen. Counsel 
(Mar. 13, 2003), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf.  As Air Force Major 
General Jack Rives wrote in one of the memoranda: 
[T]he use of the more extreme interrogation techniques simply is not how the U.S. 
armed forces have operated in recent history.  We have taken the legal and moral 
“high-road” in the conduct of our military operations regardless of how others may 
operate.  Our forces are trained in this legal and moral mindset beginning the day they 
enter active duty.  It should be noted that law of armed conflict and code of conduct 
training have been mandated by Congress and emphasized since the Viet Nam conflict 
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explainable simply by suggesting that this is a “cooperation game” where 
military officers wish to obey international law solely to ensure that U.S. 
targets or captured soldiers in the future are treated similarly.  Instead, it 
seems clear that these officials have internalized the values of international 
law and see them as part of what is required, both morally and strategically.  
Similarly, in the environmental context, we have seen multinational 
corporations supporting the Kyoto protocol on global climate change,113 
either because they want to take part in the growing international trade in 
pollution credits,114 or because they seek future profits from investments in 
renewable energy.115  Such activities suggest that corporations, through the 
mechanism of capitalist self-interest, have come to internalize (and seek 
profit from) an international environmental norm.  Further, such norm 
internalization by nongovernmental entities can in turn influence 
governmental actors. 
Finally, obedience to international legal norms, even if sometimes 
detrimental to state interests in the short term—because one is restrained 
from taking certain actions—may further state interests in the longer term by 
allowing the state to have legitimacy and a certain morally persuasive voice 
in the eyes of other states.  Indeed, it is significant that Goldsmith and Posner 
almost entirely exclude so-called “soft law”116 or “soft power”117 from their 
 
when our POWs were subjected to torture by their captors.  We need to consider the 
overall impact of approving extreme interrogation techniques as giving official 
approval and legal sanction to the application of interrogation techniques that U.S. 
forces have consistently been trained are unlawful. 
Memorandum from Jack L. Rives, Major Gen., U.S. Air Force, Deputy Judge Advocate Gen., to Air 
Force Gen. Counsel (Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf. 
113. Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 
I.L.M. 22. 
114. See Ricardo Bayon, Trading Futures in Dirty Air: Here’s a Market-Based Way to Fight 
Global Warming, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2001, at B02 (arguing that President Bush should sign on to 
the Kyoto Protocol in part because the emerging market in pollution credits is poised to be 
extremely profitable); Jay Newton-Small & Jonathan D. Salant, GM, DuPont Adapt to Kyoto 
Environmental Standards, BLOOMBERG NEWS SERV., Nov. 15, 2004, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=71000001&refer=us&sid=aSedVkbj0CwQ (“Enron 
Corp., DuPont, American Express Power Co. and other U.S. companies urged Bush to salvage parts 
of the treaty, saying they viewed regulation as inevitable and they wanted credit for cutting their 
emissions.”); see also Marianne Lavelle, A Shift in the Wind on Global Warming, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Mar. 19, 2001, at 39, 39 (“Many businesses active on global warming envision . . . a 
market-based trading system that would allow farmers and others who cut carbon emissions to get 
credits they could sell to carbon-emitting businesses.  Perhaps that’s why traditional 
manufacturers . . . have joined forces with pro-regulatory groups like the Pew Center for Global 
Climate Change.”). 
115. See William Drozdiak, U.S. Firms Become “Green” Advocates: Global Warming Talks 
Near End, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2000, at E1 (“Aidan Murphy, vice president at Shell International, 
says the Kyoto treaty has prompted the British-Dutch oil company to shift some of its focus away 
from petroleum toward alternative fuel sources.”). 
116. For discussions of “soft law,” see, for example, Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, 
Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 53 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000); Christine Chinkin, 
Normative Development in the International Legal System, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: 
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analysis.  Yet it is difficult to see how a state could hope to further its long-
term interests without being able to convince others to follow certain policies 
simply through the power of persuasion and moral authority.  The problem is 
that Goldsmith and Posner, because they simply assume a set of interests, 
provide no way of choosing between these short-term and longer-term 
interests.  As Martha Finnemore has pointed out:  
[I]t is all fine and well to assume that states want power, security, and 
wealth, but what kind of power?  Power for what ends?  What kind of 
security?  What does security mean?  How do you ensure or obtain it?  
Similarly, what kind of wealth?  Wealth for whom?  How do you 
obtain it?118   
Goldsmith and Posner, like the neorealists and neoliberals before them, have 
no answer to these questions.  And, even worse, their framework does not 
allow such questions to be raised. 
To be sure, one can certainly find instances when international law does 
appear to envision itself as a coercive set of rules meant to constrain states.  
For example, the U.N. Charter lays out a use-of-force regime that is clearly 
intended to prevent states from engaging in certain belligerent acts.119  And 
we can readily concede that states might sometimes refuse to follow such 
constraints—as with the Bush doctrine of preemptive war—though such 
refusal may carry severe consequences to the nonconforming state.120  Thus, 
when Goldsmith and Posner argue that such international law regimes do not, 
in the end, stop states from pursuing their own interests, such a statement 
may be true in a certain limited category of cases. 
But just as importantly, many aspects of the international normative 
order do not lend themselves to this type of framework.  Indeed, by 
excluding soft law, Goldsmith and Posner limit their field of vision to the 
formal, state-centered international law regimes that are arguably playing a 
less and less important role in the transnational order.121  Moreover, in many 
cases, it is not that the international regime is constraining states but that the 
 
THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 21 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); 
Dinah Shelton, Compliance with International Human Rights Soft Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS 9 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997). 
117. See, e.g., JOSEPH S. NYE, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD’S 
ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO IT ALONE 9 (2002) (defining soft power as “getting others to want 
what you want”). 
118. FINNEMORE, supra note 13, at 1–2. 
119. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
120. For example, other countries may withhold funds or manpower, and forging compromise 
on a host of other issues may become more difficult. 
121. See Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005) (discussing this expansion of international law to include less formal 
transnational and international mechanisms). 
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international regime creates the impetus for action in the first place.  For 
example: 
Prior to the actions of UNESCO, most states, especially less 
developed countries, had no notion that they needed or wanted a state 
science bureaucracy.  Similarly, European heads of state were not 
particularly concerned about treatment of the war wounded until Henri 
Dunant and the International Committee of the Red Cross made it an 
issue.  Global poverty alleviation, while long considered desirable in 
the abstract, was not considered a pressing responsibility of states, 
particularly of developed states, until the World Bank under Robert 
McNamara made it a necessary part of development.122 
Thus, the persuasive power of international norms caused states to develop 
interests they might not otherwise have had. 
In each of these instances, international law is shaping the 
consciousness of state actors, not operating to constrain them from taking 
actions they would otherwise pursue.  Similarly, as Thomas Berger argues, in 
Germany and Japan today, antimilitarism is as crucial to national identity as 
militarism was in the World War II era.123  These are changes in the states’ 
conceptions of their own interests, influenced by the international legal 
regime that Germany in particular has long championed.  Again, the 
important impact of such international regimes has no place in the 
Goldsmith–Posner framework. 
Indeed, Goldsmith and Posner go so far as to deny that the existence of 
a legal norm or agreement necessarily changes the constitutive terms of the 
relationships among nation–states.  According to Goldsmith and Posner, even 
a treaty exerts no “normative pull.”124  Rather, “[s]tates refrain from violating 
treaties (when they do) for the same basic reason they refrain from violating 
nonlegal agreements: because they fear retaliation from the other state or 
some kind of reputational loss, or because they fear a failure of 
coordination.”125  But once Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge that 
reputational loss could factor into nation–state decisionmaking, they have 
essentially conceded that the treaty regime does indeed have a normative 
pull.  This is because the potential reputational loss is made greater by the 
existence of the treaty regime itself.  The treaty effectively alters the terms of 
the relationship among the parties and necessarily changes their bargaining 
positions.  The same is true of customary international law.  Once a norm is 
named a customary international law norm, then violation of that norm will 
have far more serious reputational costs.  This is not to say that states will 
never violate such a customary norm, but rather that the naming of the norm 
 
122. FINNEMORE, supra note 13, at 12. 
123. THOMAS U. BERGER, CULTURES OF ANTIMILITARISM: NATIONAL SECURITY IN GERMANY 
AND JAPAN 8–9 (1998). 
124. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 90. 
125. Id. 
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itself makes violating the norm that much more difficult without suffering 
consequences.  Again, the international legal framework changes the 
constitutive relationship among nation–states. 
Goldsmith and Posner respond by saying that such reputational costs do 
not amount to a true normative pull, and they liken a treaty to a nonbinding 
letter of intent, which they argue does not itself cause parties to follow its 
terms.126  But, of course, that is precisely how seemingly nonbinding letters 
of intent do work.  By stating an intent to do something, a party vastly 
increases the likelihood of doing it because the statement of the intent to be 
bound changes expectations of the parties and increases reputational costs for 
noncompliance.127 
Thus, while the Goldsmith–Posner framework has the advantage of 
simplicity, we must be careful that simplicity does not devolve into 
oversimplification or simplemindedness.  We need a richer account of how 
law actually operates, both domestically and internationally, than the 
positivist vision Goldsmith and Posner assume.  We imbibe legal norms and 
cognitive categories even when we are not consciously aware of the norm in 
question.  We are persuaded by legal norms even when those norms are not 
literally enforceable.  We act in accordance with law because doing so has 
become habitual, not because we seek to avoid sanction.  We conceive of our 
interrelations with others in terms of law because our long-term interests 
require that we do so, even when our short-term interest might seem to 
counsel otherwise.  And the existence of a legal norm alters the constitutive 
terms of our relationships with others as well as the costs of noncompliance.  
All of these factors may be overcome in some circumstances.  Indeed, people 
sometimes violate domestic law just as states sometimes violate international 
law.  But in neither case does that mean that the law in question has no 
significant constraining force.  And only by thinking more broadly about 
changes in legal consciousness and the complicated social, political, and 
psychological factors that enter into the conceptualization of state interests 
can we begin to understand how international law operates. 
B. Multiple Constituencies and the Deployment of International Law 
As discussed previously, Goldsmith and Posner treat the state as a 
unitary “personality” with a single set of interests.  But, of course, the real 
world is far more messy, with a vast number of constituencies both within 
the governmental bureaucracy and outside it.  This cacophony of voices is 
 
126. See id. at 90–91. 
127. See, e.g., OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 100 
(1991) (arguing that states tend to view the nonbinding agreements that they enter into in good faith 
as political or moral obligations upon which other states will rely and expect compliance); Peter M. 
Haas, Why Comply, or Some Hypotheses in Search of an Analyst, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE 
WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS, supra note 116, at 31, 33 (arguing that activities such as monitoring a 
state’s compliance with a nonbinding agreement and direct verification of compliance may induce 
that state to comply in order to avoid detection and potential criticism). 
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important both because it challenges the seductive simplicity of the vision 
offered by Goldsmith and Posner and because many of these voices, when 
advocating policy positions, can use the moral authority or persuasive power 
of international law norms for leverage.  International law therefore becomes 
a tool of empowerment for particular actors.  These actors deploy 
international law arguments strategically, and may gain more of a foothold 
for their views because of international law.  As a result, international law 
has a significant impact in domestic foreign policy debates because it may 
change the relative power of different interest groups seeking to shape that 
policy. 
For example, although the celebrated efforts of Spanish Judge Baltasar 
Garzón to try former Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet128 were not literally 
“successful” because Pinochet was never extradited to Spain,129 they 
strengthened the hands of human rights advocates within Chile itself and 
provided the impetus for a movement that led to a Chilean Supreme Court 
decision stripping Pinochet of his lifetime immunity.130  Likewise, Spanish 
efforts to prosecute members of the Argentine military have bolstered 
 
128. Judge Garzón issued an arrest order based on allegations of kidnappings, torture, and 
planned disappearances of Chilean citizens and citizens of other countries.  Spanish Request to 
Arrest General Pinochet, Oct. 16, 1998, reprinted in THE PINOCHET PAPERS: THE CASE OF 
AUGUSTO PINOCHET IN SPAIN AND BRITAIN 57–59 (Reed Brody & Michael Ratner eds., 2000) 
[hereinafter THE PINOCHET PAPERS].  See also Anne Swardson, Pinochet, Pinochet Case Tries 
Spanish Legal Establishment, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1998, at A27 (“As Chilean president from 
1973 to 1990, Garzón’s arrest order said, Pinochet was ‘the leader of an international organization 
created . . . to conceive, develop and execute the systematic planning of illegal detentions 
[kidnappings], torture, forced relocations, assassinations and/or disappearances of numerous 
persons, including Argentines, Spaniards, Britons, Americans, Chileans and other nationalities.’”).  
On October 30, 1998, the Spanish National Court ruled unanimously that Spanish courts had 
jurisdiction over the matter based both on the principle of universal jurisdiction (that crimes against 
humanity can be tried anywhere at any time) and the passive personality principle of jurisdiction 
(that courts may try cases if their nationals are victims of crime, regardless of where the crime was 
committed).  S Audiencia Nacional, Nov. 5, 1998 (No. 173/98), reprinted in THE PINOCHET 
PAPERS, supra, at 95, 95–107.  For an English translation of the opinion, see THE PINOCHET 
PAPERS, supra, at 95, 95–107.  The Office of the Special Prosecutor alleged that Spaniards living in 
Chile were among those killed under Pinochet’s rule.  Id. at 106. 
129. Pinochet was physically in Great Britain.  The British House of Lords ultimately ruled that 
Pinochet was not entitled to head-of-state immunity for acts of torture and could be extradited to 
Spain.  Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 
147, 204–05 (H.L. 1999) (appeal taken from Q.B. Div’l Ct.) (holding that the International 
Convention Against Torture, incorporated into United Kingdom law in 1988, prevented Pinochet 
from claiming head-of-state immunity after 1988, because the universal jurisdiction contemplated 
by the Convention is inconsistent with immunity for former heads of state).  Nevertheless, the 
British government refused to extradite, citing Pinochet’s failing health. See Jack Straw, Sec’y of 
State Statement in the House of Commons (Mar. 2, 2000), in THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note 
128, at 481, 482 (“[I]n the light of th[e] medical evidence . . . I . . . conclude[d] that no purpose 
would be served by continuing the Spanish extradition request.”).  Pinochet was eventually returned 
to Chile. 
130. See Chile’s Top Court Strips Pinochet of Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at A3 
(“Chile’s Supreme Court stripped the former dictator Augusto Pinochet of immunity from 
prosecution in a notorious human rights case on Thursday, raising hopes of victims that he may 
finally face trial for abuses during his 17-year rule.”). 
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reformers within the Argentine government, most notably President Nestor 
Kirschner.  In August 2003, Judge Garzón sought extradition from Argentina 
of dozens of Argentines for human rights abuses committed under the 
Argentine military government in the 1970s.131  In addition, Garzón 
successfully sought extradition from Mexico of one former Argentine Navy 
lieutenant who was accused of murdering hundreds of people.132  In the wake 
of Garzón’s actions, realist observers complained that such transnational 
prosecutions were illegitimate because Argentina had previously conferred 
amnesty on those who had been involved in the period of military rule and 
therefore any prosecution would infringe on Argentina’s sovereign “choice” 
to grant amnesty.133 
But the amnesty decision was not simply a unitary choice made by some 
unified “state” of Argentina; it was a politically contested act that remained 
controversial within the country.134  And the Spanish extradition request itself 
gave President Kirschner more leverage in his tug-of-war with the legal 
establishment over the amnesty laws.  Just a month after Garzón’s request, 
both houses of the Argentine Congress voted by large majorities to annul the 
laws.135  Meanwhile the Spanish government decided that it would not make 
the formal extradition request to Argentina that Garzón sought, but it did so 
based primarily on the fact that Argentina had begun to scrap its amnesty 
laws and the accused would therefore be subject to domestic human rights 
prosecution.136  President Kirshner therefore could use Spain’s announcement 
to increase pressure on the Argentine Supreme Court to officially overturn 
the amnesty laws.137 
 
131. See Larry Rohter, Argentine Congress Likely to Void “Dirty War” Amnesties, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 21, 2003, at A3 (recounting Garzón’s extradition request). 
132. Emma Daly, Spanish Judge Sends Argentine to Prison on Genocide Charge, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 30, 2003, at A3 (“In an unusual act of international judicial cooperation, and a victory for the 
Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón, Mexico’s Supreme Court ruled this month that the former officer, 
Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, could be extradited to Spain for crimes reportedly committed in a third 
country, Argentina.”). 
133. See David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Crimes Outside the World’s Jurisdiction, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 22, 2003, at A19 (noting that Argentina had granted amnesty to Cavallo and arguing 
that “Judge Garzón is essentially ignoring Argentina’s own history and desires”). 
134. The Argentine army, for example, made known its desire for amnesty for human rights 
abuses through several revolts in the late 1980s.  The Argentine Congress granted amnesty after one 
such uprising in 1987.  See Joseph B. Treaster, Argentine President Orders Troops To End Revolt, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1988, § 1, at 13 (describing an army revolt in Buenos Aires). 
135. Argentina’s Day of Reckoning, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 24, 2004, at C26. 
136. Elizabeth Nash, Garzón Blocked Over “Dirty War” Extraditions, THE INDEPENDENT, 
Aug. 30, 2003, at 14; see also Al Goodman, Spain Blocks Trials of Argentines, CNN.COM, Aug. 29, 
2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/08/29/spanish.argentina/index.html (quoting the 
Spanish attorney for the victims saying that the Spanish government’s decision sends a “powerful 
message” to Argentina’s Supreme Court to overturn the amnesty laws). 
137. See Héctor Tobar, Judge Orders Officers Freed: The Argentine Military Men Accused of 
Rights Abuses in the ‘70s and ‘80s May Still Face Trials, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2003, at A3 
(“President Nestor Kirchner used Spain’s announcement to increase pressure on the Argentine 
Supreme Court to overturn the amnesty laws that prohibit trying the men here.”). 
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Finally, on June 14, 2005, the Argentine Supreme Court did in fact 
strike down the amnesty laws, thus clearing the way for domestic human 
rights prosecutions.138  Not only was the pressure exerted by Spain 
instrumental in these efforts, but it is significant that the Argentine Court 
cited as legal precedent a 2001 decision of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights striking down a similar amnesty provision in Peru as 
incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights and hence 
without legal effect.139  So, in the end, the “sovereign” state of Argentina 
made political and legal choices to repeal the amnesty laws just as it had 
previously made choices to create them.  But in this change of heart we can 
see the degree to which international legal pronouncements, even if they are 
without any literal constraining effect, may significantly alter the domestic 
political terrain. 
Likewise, official international institutions, such as the U.N., can also 
pressure local bureaucracies, for example, by creating international 
commissions of inquiry concerning alleged atrocities, or by threatening 
prosecutions in international courts.  Such declarations can empower 
reformers within local bureaucracies, who can then argue for institutional 
changes as a way of staving off international interference.  For example, in 
the aftermath of the violence in East Timor that followed its vote for 
independence, there were grave concerns that the Indonesian government 
would not pursue human rights investigations of the military personnel 
allegedly responsible for the violence.140  Thus, an International Commission 
of Inquiry was established, and U.N. officials warned that an international 
court might be necessary.141  As with Chile and Argentina, such actions 
strengthened the hand of reformers within Indonesia, such as then-Attorney 
General Marzuki Darusman.  With the specter of international action hanging 
over Indonesia, Darusman made several statements arguing that, for 
nationalist reasons, a hard-hitting Indonesian investigation was necessary in 
order to forestall an international takeover of the process.142  Not 
 
138. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, “Simón, Julio Héctor y otros s/ privación 
ilegítima de la libertad,” causa No. 17.768, S.1767.XXXVIII (Arg.).  See also Press Release, 
Human Rights Watch, Argentina: Amnesty Laws Struck Down (June 14, 2005), available at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/14/argent11119.htm. 
139. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, “Simón, Julio Héctor y otros s/ privación 
ilegítima de la libertad,” causa No. 17.768, S.1767.XXXVIII (Arg.).  See also Press Release, supra 
note 138. 
140. See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, The Dance of Complementarity: Relationships Among 
Domestic, International, and Transnational Accountability Mechanisms in East Timor and 
Indonesia, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 
319, 358–61 (Jane E. Stromseth ed., 2003) (discussing ways in which international pressure on 
Indonesia in the period just after East Timor gained its independence strengthened the hand of 
reformers within the Indonesian government to push for robust domestic accountability mechanisms 
for atrocities committed during the period leading up to the independence vote). 
141. Id. at 358–59. 
142. See id. at 360 (documenting the response of the Indonesian government, which appointed 
an investigative team, identified priority cases, named suspects, and collected evidence). 
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surprisingly, when this international pressure dissipated after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, so did the momentum to provide real 
accountability in Indonesia for the atrocities committed.143  Thus, we can 
again see that international legal activity (or the lack of it) alters the domestic 
terrain. 
Indeed, even in the United States, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals recently stayed an execution,144 based in part on a prior decision of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations,145 despite the fact that the ICJ had no means of literally 
enforcing its decision in Oklahoma.  Likewise, the Bush administration 
ultimately issued a directive that state courts should comply with the ICJ 
decision.146  And in the trade context, although ad hoc tribunals convened 
under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
have no authority to directly reverse the decisions of national courts or create 
formally binding precedent, Robert Ahdieh has argued that, over time, we 
may see the interactions between the NAFTA panels and national courts take 
on a dialectical quality that is neither the direct hierarchical review 
traditionally undertaken by appellate courts, nor simply the dialogue that 
often occurs under the doctrine of comity.147  Instead, Ahdieh predicts that 
international courts are likely to exert an important influence even as the 
national courts retain formal independence, much as U.S. federal courts 
exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction may influence state court 
interpretations of U.S. constitutional norms in criminal cases.148  In turn, the 
 
143. See id. at 364–66 (discussing the shifting priorities of the Bush administration following 
the 9/11 attacks and tracing the impact of outside pressure in efforts to hold individuals accountable 
for the violence in East Timor). 
144. Torres v. Oklahoma (Torres II), No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) 
(unpublished order) (order granting stay of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing). 
145. Id. (Chapel, J., concurring) (stating his belief that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals was bound by the ICJ’s decision in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United 
States), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31)).  The same day the stay was granted, the governor of Oklahoma 
commuted the defendant’s death sentence, stating in a press release: “I took into account the fact 
that the U.S. signed the 1963 Vienna Convention and is part of that treaty.”  Press Release, Office of 
Governor Brad Henry, Gov. Henry Grants Clemency to Death Row Inmate Torres (May 13, 2004) 
(on file with author), available at http://www.governor.state.ok.us/ 
display_article.php?article_id=301&article_type=1.  The press release also stated that the 
Governor’s office had been contacted by the U.S. State Department.  Id. 
146. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales 
(Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html. 
Of course, the administration also sought to undermine the ICJ by announcing its intention to 
withdraw from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention, which gives the ICJ jurisdiction 
over disputes concerning the Convention. See Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at A01. There can be little doubt, however, that the international court 
judgment at the very least changed the state of political and legal play concerning compliance with 
the Vienna Convention. 
147. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National 
Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2032–34 (2004) (arguing that NAFTA tribunals and U.S. state 
courts operate in dialectical relationship to each other). 
148. Id. at 2034. 
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decisions of national courts may also come to influence international 
tribunals.  This dialectical relationship, if it emerges, will exist without an 
official hierarchical relationship based on coercive power.149 
Finally, there can be little doubt that local actors, outside of official 
government bureaucracies or judicial institutions, can at times leverage 
international legal norms to press causes within their countries.150  For 
example, as late as 1994, women in Hong Kong were unable to inherit 
land.151  That year a group of rural indigenous women joined forces with 
urban women’s groups to demand legal change.  As detailed by Sally Engle 
Merry and Rachel E. Stern, “[t]he indigenous women slowly shifted from 
seeing their stories as individual kinship violations to broader examples of 
discrimination.”152  Ultimately, the women learned to protest these unjust 
customary laws in the language of international human rights and gender 
equality.153  Having done so, they were successful at getting the inheritance 
rules overturned.154  While we might regret the fact that these women were 
forced to “translate” their grievances into an internationally recognized 
language in order to be heard, the success of the movement in accessing 
political power surely attests to the strength and importance of the 
international law discourse. 
This same story has been replicated numerous times around the world.  
Assisted by a global network of NGOs and activists, indigenous movements 
use international norms to influence local political or judicial actors.  In June 
2005, communities from across the Niger Delta filed a case in the Federal 
High Court of Nigeria against several oil companies to stop the practice of 
“gas flaring,” which poses severe health risks and contributes to greenhouse 
gas emissions.155  Though nominally brought under the Nigerian 
 
149. To be sure, Chapter 11 tribunals do have the power to issue damage awards that private 
litigants can then enforce against federal authorities, but there is no direct review of the state court 
decision nor any mechanism of coercive power that can be exercised against any state officials or 
judicial actors.  See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, art. 
1135, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) (outlining remedies 
available under Chapter 11). 
150. Of course, such local actors do not only “use” international law as “given” to them, but 
also, through their social movements, shape the international legal norms themselves.  For an 
argument that human rights discourse has been fundamentally shaped by Third World resistance to 
development, see generally BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: 
DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003). 
151. Sally Engle Merry & Rachel E. Stern, The Female Inheritance Movement in Hong Kong: 
Theorizing the Local/Global Interface, 46 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 387, 387 (2005). 
152. Id. at 399. 
153. See id. at 390 (explaining the evolution of the Anti-Discrimination Female Indigenous 
Residents Committee from a group that perceived the prohibition of female inheritance as a 
personal wrong perpetrated by relatives to a group arguing that the male-only inheritance laws 
failed to comply with international agreements, such as the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 
154. Id. at 394. 
155. Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nig., Suit No. FHC/B/CS/153/2005. On November 
14, 2005, the Federal High Court of Nigeria in Benin City ruled that Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron, 
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Constitution, the complaint explicitly references the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights and argues for a right to a “clean, poison-free, 
pollution free and healthy environment.”156  Other environmental groups seek 
to have sites placed on UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee list of 
protected sites so that they can then pressure their local governments to take 
steps to limit environmental damage to the sites.157  Consumer groups 
organize worldwide boycotts on the rhetorical strength of rights discourse.158  
Meanwhile, many African countries, responding in part to pressure from 
international human rights activists, have recently enacted laws forbidding 
the practice known as female genital cutting.159  And of course, it isn’t only 
social movements that use the language and institutions of international law 
to access domestic power.  Thus, transnational corporations have deployed 
the rhetoric of international free trade law and have used bodies such as the 
NAFTA tribunals or the World Trade Organization to avoid being subject to 
domestic regulation.160 
Regardless of whether or not one thinks the proliferation and 
deployment of international norms in domestic political and legal debates is a 
 
Exxon Mobil, and other oil companies must end natural gas flaring in Nigeria, claiming that the 
practice was a waste and violated the local communities’ constitutional rights to life and dignity.  A 
copy of the judicial order is available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/media/ 
gas.flaring.suit.nov2005/ni.shell.nov05.decision.pdf. 
156. Complaint at 4, Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nig., Suit No. FHC/B/CS/153/2005, 
available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/gas.flaring.suit/case.pleadings.20June2005.pdf. 
157. For example, the countries of Belize, Nepal, and Peru recently petitioned the World 
Heritage Committee to place the Belize Barrier Reef, Mount Everest, and Huarascan National 
Park on its list of World Heritage in Danger Sites, because of threats to the sites due to global 
climate change.  See Press Release, Climate Justice, UNESCO Danger-Listing Petitions Presented 
(Nov. 17, 2004), available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/UNESCO.petitions.release.  
“Danger-listing” is a legal mechanism under the Convention Concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151, which 
requires State Parties to the Convention to take action to transmit World Heritage Sites to future 
generations. 
158. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 480–
82 (2002) (discussing such efforts).  As The Economist has observed, “a multinational’s failure to 
look like a good global citizen is increasingly expensive in a world where consumers and pressure 
groups can be quickly mobilised behind a cause.”  Multinationals and Their Morals, ECONOMIST, 
Dec. 2–8, 1995, at 18–19.  For discussion of how noncompliance with entrenched international law 
norms may result in lost economic opportunities for subnational units, crucial to economic 
prosperity in a globalized economy, see Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) 
Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 672–73 (2002), in which he outlines ways that consumers, non-
governmental organizations, and states can pressure corporations to boycott investment and 
development in regions that fail to follow standards of international law. 
159. Leigh A. Trueblood, Female Genital Mutilation: A Discussion of International Human 
Rights Instruments, Cultural Sovereignty and Dominance Theory, 28 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
437, 464–65 (2000) (describing how the efforts of international organizations, NGOs, and other 
groups have led many countries, including Cameroon, Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, Burkina Faso, and 
Ivory Coast, to pass legislation against female genital cutting). 
160. See, e.g., Benjamin W. Putnam, Note, The Cross-Border Trucking Dispute: Finding a Way 
Out of the Conflict Between NAFTA and U.S. Environmental Law, 82 TEXAS L. REV. 1287, 1307–
08 (2004) (describing cases in which regulated entities cite NAFTA to avoid the requirements of 
domestic environmental laws). 
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good thing, it is difficult to deny the trend.  Thus, the interaction between the 
international and the local cannot simply be viewed as Goldsmith and Posner 
view it: a state pursuing a single set of interests either completely constrained 
or completely unconstrained by international norms.  Rather, as part of the 
multivalent, messy process by which various state constituencies vie to have 
their preferred policies adopted, international legal norms are a powerful 
tool.  These norms provide a set of moral, rhetorical, and strategic arguments 
that may empower constituencies that might not otherwise have a voice, or 
they may be used by already powerful forces to protect their own interests.  
In any event, only by going beyond the simplistic model of the unitary state 
pursuing a single set of interests can we see the power of international law 
coursing below the surface. 
III. A Cosmopolitan Alternative 
Goldsmith and Posner reject a cosmopolitan vision of international legal 
ordering, which they define as the requirement that states act based on 
global, rather than state, welfare.  In conceptualizing cosmopolitanism in this 
way, they join other scholars on both the left and right in assuming that 
cosmopolitanism is equivalent to universalism.161  Yet cosmopolitanism does 
not require a belief in a single global welfare or even a single universal set of 
governing norms, nor does it necessarily require that global welfare trump 
state welfare.  Indeed, cosmopolitanism is not at all incompatible with the 
idea of nation–states, nor does it assume that the state is somehow 
unimportant.  Thus, Goldsmith and Posner provide a caricatured vision of 
cosmopolitanism.  This is a shame, because a more nuanced understanding of 
cosmopolitan theory offers a useful framework for conceptualizing the 
interplay of multiple actors in the transnational system we see operating 
today.  Indeed, cosmopolitanism may in fact offer a more useful framework 
than the reductionist, state-centric vision Goldsmith and Posner offer. 
Cosmopolitanism is a useful trope for conceptualizing the current period 
of interaction across territorial borders precisely because it recognizes that 
people have multiple affiliations, extending from the local to the global (and 
many nonterritorial affiliations as well).  For example, Martha Nussbaum has 
stressed that cosmopolitanism does not require one to give up local 
identifications, which, she acknowledges, “can be a source of great richness 
 
161. See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 4, at 879 (“Rather than aspiring to universal cosmopolitanism, 
statelessness may well foster reversion to a selfish individualism.”) (emphasis added); see also 
Bruce Ackerman, Rooted Cosmopolitanism, 104 ETHICS 516, 534 (1994) (“If I were a European 
right now, I hope I would have the guts to stand up for rootless cosmopolitanism: forget this 
nationalistic claptrap, and let us build a world worthy of free and equal human beings.”); Anupam 
Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1046 (2001) (“The cosmopolitan model . . . 
dissolves the multirootedness of diasporas into a global identity.”). 
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in life.”162  Rather, following the Stoics, she suggests that we think of 
ourselves as surrounded by a series of concentric circles: 
The first one encircles the self, the next takes in the immediate family, 
then follows the extended family, then, in order, neighbors or local 
groups, fellow city-dwellers, and fellow countrymen—and we can 
easily add to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical, 
professional, gender, or sexual identities.  Outside all these circles is 
the largest one, humanity as a whole.163 
Therefore, we need not relinquish special affiliations and identifications with 
the various groups of which we may feel a part.164 
In this vision, people could be “cosmopolitan patriots,” accepting their 
responsibility to nurture the culture and politics of their home community, 
while at the same time recognizing that such cultural practices are always 
shifting, as people move from place to place or are increasingly affected by 
spatially distant actors.165  “The result would be a world in which each local 
form of human life is the result of long-term and persistent processes of 
cultural hybridization—a world, in that respect, much like the world we live 
in now.”166 
Thus, cosmopolitanism is emphatically not a model of international 
citizenship in the sense of international harmonization and standardization, 
but is instead a recognition of multiple refracted differences where people 
acknowledge links with the “other” without demanding assimilation or 
ostracism.  Cosmopolitanism seeks “flexible citizenship,” in which people 
are permitted to shift identities amid a plurality of possible affiliations and 
allegiances, including nonterritorial communities.167  The cosmopolitan 
worldview shifts back and forth from the rooted particularity of personal 
identity to the global possibility of multiple overlapping communities.  
“[I]nstead of an ideal of detachment, actually existing cosmopolitanism is a 
reality of (re)attachment, multiple attachment, or attachment at a distance.”168 
A cosmopolitan conception of law, therefore, aims to capture a middle 
ground between strict territorialism on the one hand and expansive 
 
162. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: 
DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 2, 9 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996). 
163. Id. 
164. See id. (“We need not think of [local affiliations] as superficial, and we may think of our 
identity as constituted partly by them.”). 
165. Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, in COSMOPOLITICS: THINKING AND 
FEELING BEYOND THE NATION 91, 91–92 (Pheng Cheah & Bruce Robbins eds., 1998) [hereinafter 
COSMOPOLITICS]. 
166. Id. at 92. 
167. See AIHWA ONG, FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP: THE CULTURAL LOGICS OF 
TRANSNATIONALITY 6 (1999) (describing how “the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, 
travel, and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing 
political-economic conditions” foster a form of transnationality she calls “flexible citizenship”). 
168. Bruce Robbins, Introduction Part I: Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism, in 
COSMOPOLITICS, supra note 165, at 1, 3. 
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universalism on the other.  A territorialist approach fails to account for the 
wide variety of community affiliations and social interactions that defy 
territorial boundaries.  A more universalist perspective, by contrast, which 
seeks to imagine people as world citizens first and foremost, might seem to 
be a useful alternative.  But such universalism tends to presuppose a world 
citizenry devoid of both particularist ties and normative discussion about the 
relative importance of such ties.  Thus, universalism cuts off debate about the 
nature of overlapping communities just as surely as territorialism does. 
A cosmopolitan conception, in contrast, makes no attempt to deny the 
multirooted nature of individuals within a variety of communities, both 
territorial and nonterritorial.  Thus, although a cosmopolitan conception 
might acknowledge the potential importance of asserting universal norms in 
specific circumstances, it does not require a universalist belief in a single 
world community.  As a result, cosmopolitanism offers a promising rubric 
for analyzing law in a world of diverse normative voices. 
For example, with regard to jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition 
of judgments, I have argued elsewhere that a cosmopolitan perspective would 
allow courts to look at the relevant community affiliation of the parties rather 
than undertake a formalist exercise in counting literal contacts with a 
territorial entity.169  More broadly, cosmopolitanism allows us to 
conceptualize a broader practice that I call jurispersuasion, in which legal 
and quasi-legal actors assert jurisdiction and express norms even without 
literal enforcement power.170  These actors draw on epistemic community 
affiliations to persuade others to enforce their judgments or normative 
statements.  As constructivists have recognized, “[n]ormative claims become 
powerful and prevail by being persuasive; being persuasive means grounding 
claims in existing norms in ways that emphasize normative congruence and 
coherence.”171  Cosmopolitanism, far more than rational choice theory, 
attempts to capture this multivalent process of norm development and 
persuasion across territorial borders. 
Indeed, though the model of international cooperation among states that 
Goldsmith and Posner envision has a contractarian cast, their model is 
strictly that of a series of isolated transactional contracts: parties see a 
mutual interest in cooperating and thus agree to cooperate.  This is a 
peculiarly thin model of contract, however, and it underestimates the ways in 
which new interests can grow out of the contracting process itself. 
Drawing on the scholarly literature concerning relational contract, in 
contrast, we may come to see the agreement to cooperate as the first step in 
creating a contractors’ community that over time begins to develop new 
 
169. See Berman, supra note 158, at 322 (discussing jurisdiction); Paul Schiff Berman, 
Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global 
Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1839–67 (discussing choice of law and recognition of judgments). 
170. For further discussion of jurispersuasion, see Berman, supra note 121, at 533–38. 
171. FINNEMORE, supra note 13, at 141. 
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norms of reciprocity and loyalty, along with a concomitant interest in 
fostering and protecting both the community itself and those emerging 
norms.172  Thus, as transnational groups work together to cooperate and solve 
specific problems, staffs of personnel are created, and these staff members 
tend to be inculcated in the norms of the group and invested in maintaining 
relations with each other.  As a result, transnational networks of government 
bureaucrats, trade-promoting groups, human rights NGOs, and the like form 
de facto cosmopolitan communities, affiliations of people who have come to 
see that the welfare of their state is interlinked with the welfare of others, and 
that evaluations of “utility” or “interest” are interdependent.  This is an 
enlarged vision of where a state’s interest lies, organically evolved from 
agreements motivated by more short-term and immediate objectives. 
Thus, cosmopolitanism need not be seen as a moral call to have states 
adopt global standards of well-being while denying state interest.  To the 
contrary, cosmopolitanism recognizes the important historical and emotional 
pull of the state.  In addition, it celebrates diverse normative orders in 
multiple communities and need not insist on homogenizing that diversity into 
one global culture or one international legal framework. 
But state communities are not the only salient community affiliations 
people possess, and we need a framework to account for the multiple 
overlapping community assertions that regularly take place, particularly in an 
era of globalization.  Whether we are talking about courts being influenced 
by other courts around the world, ethnic groups or transnational norm 
entrepreneurs asserting norms across territorial borders, the melding of legal 
norms that takes place in liminal areas, or the development of transnational 
non-state lawmaking, there can be little doubt that the state is only one 
community affiliation among many.  And while a more detailed discussion of 
this cosmopolitan framework is beyond the scope of this brief Book Review 
Essay, it seems clear that any useful framework for understanding law on the 
world stage must examine these multiple voices.  Cosmopolitanism permits, 
and encourages, such study, while the rational choice theory of Goldsmith 
and Posner reductively excludes all voices other than that of the unitary state. 
IV. Conclusion 
There remains much work to be done, of course, to analyze more fully 
the myriad ways that international legal norms may affect cognitive 
categories, conceptions of interests, domestic decisionmaking processes, and 
the creation of cosmopolitan communities.  But such study will necessarily 
take place far beyond the limited vision of international law that Goldsmith 
 
172. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Commons, and Associations: Why the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 Misfired, 22 YALE J. REG. 315, 324 (2005) (noting that in 
relational contracts, virtually all daily decisions within the general parameters of the deal “are 
resolved in a continuous and ongoing relationship that depends on some high level of trust and 
cooperation”). 
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and Posner construct.  By refusing at the outset even to consider the ways 
international law might affect state decisionmaking short of outright 
coercion, Goldsmith and Posner ensure that no possible role for international 
law will be found beyond simply as a tool for state self interest. 
Thus, The Limits of International Law is not, in the end, a descriptive 
account of how international law works, but a normative vision advancing an 
ideology of international relations realism.  Ironically, though Goldsmith and 
Posner refuse to recognize the ways international law may shape legal 
consciousness, they themselves are nevertheless attempting to affect legal 
consciousness in the United States.  They fear that the moral force of 
international legal norms will galvanize opposition to state policies, so they 
wish to persuade readers that such force does not and should not exist. 
But saying it does not make it so.  State interests do not operate in 
isolation from social and psychological realities.  Likewise, state interests are 
not unitary.  They arise through complicated processes of norm generation 
and multivalent disputes over policy.  As a result, the reductionist model of 
game theoretic interaction among states pursuing single interests in clearly 
defined contexts simply has no basis in the real world. 
So, while no one would say that international law binds all states all the 
time, international legal norms are part of the context within which state 
decisions are made, and they provide a set of arguments for domestic 
constituencies to draw upon in advancing policies.  Moreover, international 
cooperation and international norms create and foster epistemic communities, 
transnational groups who, over time, come to conceive of themselves as 
bound up with others across nation–state borders.  These are the processes of 
cosmopolitan norm development that scholars must continue to study.  But in 
order to do so, we must expand our vision of international law far beyond the 
limits that Goldsmith and Posner seek to impose. 
